PROJECT
CNTR985886SUPPORT FOR REGULATION AND TRANSPARENCY OF MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND CONCENTRATION - RUSSIA
Study of European Approaches to Media Ownership
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Programme in Comparative Media Law and Policy - University of Oxford
Alison Harcourt (project researcher) and Stefaan Verhulst (project director)
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I. Main Objectives and Framework of the Study
The main objective of the study is to present an overview of the principles of media ownership regulation and transparency. This will be used to assist a working group of Russian media law experts in the drafting of a policy recommendation on media ownership.
Ownership and control are one of the most important defining issues in Russian media law and policy, especially when it concerns electronic media. Given the current economic and political crisis, the issues that have been simmering for the last several years have come to an even greater point of political conflict. In order to strengthen the understanding of the principles of media ownership regulation and transparency among key stakeholders in Russia and to aid in the drafting of appropriate legislation, this study will provide Russian experts with a concrete overview of European approaches to regulating media ownership.
The study is outlined as following: firstly a comprehensive overview is given of the policy instruments used for regulating media ownership in European countries. A methodology for comparative analysis of European national laws is developed from the identification of key policy instruments. Secondly, detailed overviews of national laws in the form of country reports are provided. Thirdly, presentation of these laws is provided in template form for comparative analysis. This is fourthly followed by a detailed examination of the approach of the European Union to media ownership with particular attention to competition policy and European Court of Justice cases. Fifthly, a list of the national and European laws and court cases is provided (most of which are available on our PCMLP netsite). Sixthly, additional references for further reading are provided at the end of the report.
Why media pluralism and media ownership are important:
The media are relied upon in democratic societies for the protection and promotion of human rights and democracy. Diversity of the media, accurate and honest reporting of the news is considered to be vital for guaranteeing pluralism of opinion, adequate political representation, and a citizen's participation in a democratic society. A pluralistic media is seen to meet the demands of democracy by providing citizens with a broad range of information and opinions; to represent minorities giving them the opportunity to maintain their separate existence in a larger society; to reduce the event of social conflict by increasing understanding between conflicting groups or interests; to contribute to overall cultural variety; to facilitate social and cultural change, particularly when it provides access to weak or marginal social groups. Media concentration is widely considered to have a detrimental impact upon pluralism. In particular, concentration of the media market curtails the representation of a wide range of political and cultural societal groups.
The wide consensus on the view that media concentration is dangerous for democratic representation is reflected in many regional and national policy and legislative documents. Especially the opinions and resolutions of the Council of Europe on media concentration are important and interesting within that context. The 1982 Declaration on the freedom of expression and information states the importance of an "existence of a wide range of independent and autonomous media, permitting the reflection of diversity of ideas and opinions". Freedom of expression is guaranteed in the Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers…"
Media concentration can occur in a number of different ways and for different reasons. Media companies can integrate both vertically and horizontally and through product diversification and internationalisation (this occurs through mergers, acquisitions, take-overs, and cross-national market planning). Presently, "traditional media" (terrestrial television, publishing, radio) is being joined by forms of media resulting from new technologies coming from the telecommunications field (cable, satellite, telephony, internet, and consumer electronics companies). A process of market convergence is underway as broadcasting, print media and communications media combine services through mergers, acquisitions and alliances.
Media companies aim towards economies of scale. This may lead to a number of negative consequences. Firstly, mergers often mean cost cutting, staff lay-offs, the closing down of media outlets, and less investment in content through which editorial independence is jeopardised. In particular, companies may sacrifice editorial independence in taking decisions concerning corporate costs. Cost cutting usually leads to a standardisation in media content, rather than diversification. This leads also to a reduction in the variation and amount of information sources.
A second concern about media concentration is the fact that large market players can close the market to new entrants, independent producers, or drive out weaker competitors. A market monopoly or oligopoly could be the result. This situation is true for other markets, but considered to be counter-competitive for the media market as well as having social costs. General competition law can be used to prevent market concentration, but not sufficient in the context of pluralism.
Media concentration may thirdly allow media owners an unwieldy heightened influence on public opinion (politically or economically; i.e. the withholding of company information). More specifically, an owner’s opinion may be integral at certain points in time: i.e. when the market status quo (in which the owner has a key interest in maintaining) is threatened, or in times of social unrest. The media gives an owner potential power to influence public opinion in his favour, and prevent counter views from reaching the general public. In principle, this could conform to the principles of freedom of speech. However, as concentration could lead to only this voice being heard, it could have negative consequences for external and internal pluralism.
Fourthly, the increased use of encryption technologies in the delivery of media content threatens to financially burden the public with high costs for popular viewing. A high cost for access could be established by gateway monopolies. The result could be the development of what has been termed as the "information rich" and the "information poor". Fifthly, the new media broadcast channels (particularly cable and satellite television) seek to identify market niches to boost profitability. This often results in specialised channels which tend to be thematic and narrow-cast. Minority audiences could be overlooked by such thematic channels (it could be the case that minority interests could also be served by these channels).
Taxonomy of policy instruments used to control media ownership
It is generally perceived that market forces alone cannot be trusted to deliver these goals -identified above. Hence the call for special, structural regulations for the media to provide a plurality of sources and diversity of content. European countries have developed a variety of policy instruments directly governing media ownership. Further regulation affects ownership in media markets. Much regulation is aimed at limiting excessive concentration in media markets. The terrestrial television and daily newspaper markets, which commonly enjoy a wide audience reach, are targeted as particularly salient for ensuring pluralistic (and democratic) representation. The importance of controlling excessive cross-media ownership between these two markets has been also a source of regulation.
Key policy instruments used to control media market concentration and those effecting ownership in media markets are: (1) general competition law and specific provisions under competition law directed towards the media. (2) Regulating media and telecommunications operators through licensing of national services (3) Requiring the promotion of media pluralism as a pre-requisite to licence-issuing. (4) lowering entry barriers to markets through legal decisions and economic incentives (tax relief, financial assistance) (5) promoting media which are seen to provide diversity of content or represent minority views (6) providing financial assistance to content providers providing a variety of content (7) guaranteeing the high quality and availability of public service broadcasting (by instituting "must carry" rules on cable, satellite and digital providers (8) adopting legal instruments to safeguard editorial independence and freedom of expression (9) requiring high transparency of company reports and activities (10) monitoring ownership patterns in media markets and making this information publicly available. (11) ensuring open networks and universal service for internet users (12) to prevent gateway monopolies of new services.
Along these lines we have developed a template identifying the key policy instruments used in regulating media ownership. The accompanying country studies shall observe in how far the European countries under observation have adopted such policy instruments based upon this template:
B. Legislation ensuring transparency of media holdings
C. Legislation concerning media ownership
1. Cartel, merger and acquisition regulation
K. Future regulatory proposals and trends
Countries under examination
We have chosen to examine and identify policy approaches in the six countries: the UK, Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands as basis for comparative analysis of regulatory models. The reason for this is firstly that the majority of media revenue in Europe is generated in those countries. At the same time these are the countries in which the major media companies ("moguls") are based or operate. Secondly, as a result of the above, these European countries are the main countries to have substantial media ownership regulation and have experimented with specific regulatory models. The remaining countries in Europe have only just begun to legislate for ownership (and cross media ownership) and are using the listed ones as model countries. (An example of this is Sweden which has recently drafted a law for media ownership based upon comparative analysis of the existing ownership regulations in Europe).
Breakdown of the 50 leading European media companies by nation (based on turnover)

II. Country Reports
A. FRANCE
Press
The first French law to regulate the press industry was the Ordinance No. 45-1483 of June 1945 (l'ordonnance no 45-1483 du 30 juin 1945). It forbade the ownership and/or control of more than one newspaper by any legal entity (individual or company). The legal entity could also not be of foreign origin. The ordinance also required the public access to company reports providing a complete financial breakdown. The legal provisions relating to ownership were however unsuccessful. Publishers largely disgarded the ownership limits and the French government did not enforce them.
From 1977, publishers were subject to the Concentration Control Law No. 77-806 of July (loi no 77-806 du 19 juillet 1977 relative au contrôle de la concentration économique et à la répression des ententes illicites et des abus de position dominante). This general competition law, which was incorporated into the later 1986 Competition Ordinance No. 86-1243 (l'ordonnance no 86-1243), stipulates that a dominant position is established when the companies involved in a merger or acquisition achieve a composite of 25% of a relevant market or a combined turnover of over 7 billion French francs. The Competition Advisory Board (Conseil de la Concurrence) monitors markets and reports any legal digressions to the Ministry for Economic Affairs. The ministry then invites parties partaking in a merger or acquisition voluntarily to request ministerial permission. It should be noted that the Competition Advisory Board is not a regulatory body and therefore not an independent decision-maker. Any decisions taken on anti-competitive behaviour are essentially made by the Minister for Economic Affairs. This may consequent in decisions which are politically motivated. Since the November 1986 Press Law, general competition law has not ordinarily been utilised in connection with the press industry as the market is now governed by specific ownership rules (as described below). General competition rules can of course be employed if specific media ownership rules are not applied to a market concentration.
New rules on the press were included in the 1984 Transparency Law No. 84-937 of October 1984 (Loi no 84-937 du 23 octobre 1984). The law imposed limits on a publisher's circulation to 15% of national dailies, 15% of regional dailies or 10% of the total circulation of national and regional dailies combined. A monitoring Committee on Press Transparency and Pluralism was set up accordingly (which was dismantled in 1986). Once again, however, the law was unsuccessful. The law's chief failing was that it was not retroactive in nature. Publishers exceeding circulation were not required to divest their interests. Large press groups made further newspaper acquisitions contrary to the disapproval of both the Committee and Ministry for Economic Affairs.
This led the French government to the decision to firstly regulate the market status quo. 1986 saw the ratification of three new media laws: the August Press Law No. 86-897, the September Freedom of Communication Law No. 86-1067 (Loi no 86-1067 du 30 septembre 1986 Relative à la liberté de communication), and the November Press Law No. 86-1210 (Loi no 86-1210 du 27 novembre 1986. Complétant la loi no 86-897 du 1er août 1986 portant réforme du régime juridique de la presse et la loi no 86-1067 du 30 septembre 1986 relative à la liberté de communication). The November Press Law was a result of political dissatisfaction (resulting from the September 1986 change in government) with the August Press Law. The November therefore amends the 1945 law and appends the 1986 August and September laws. Articles from all three 1986 laws (86-897, 86-1067, 86-1210) are presently in use to regulate the press market (along with some later amending decisions-see footnote number one).
The 1986 laws contain many rules relating to transparency and ownership. According to Article 37 of Law No. 86-1067, the following company information should be made publicly available:
Article 39 of Law No. 86-1210 states that any proposed transfer of capital amounting to one-third of voting rights must be made public to a publication's readership. Article 36 of Law No. 86-1067 requires that capital shares issued in company undertakings (such as joint-ventures) must be nominative (share holders must be named). According to Articles 75 and 76, fines of FF 6,000 to 120,000 for individual owners, or FF 10,000 to 40,000 for senior executives of limited companies (sociétés) can be issued for any digression of Article 36. Further rules affecting transparency are that any share transactions must be agreed upon by the company board of directors (conseil d'administration) or company supervisory board (conseil de surveillance); that directors must be actively participant within a company board; and that the majority shareholder of a limited company must be the director of a publication (Article 40). According to French general company law, publishing companies (as all companies) must submit their annual accounts to the Registry of the Commercial Courts.
The media ownership rules laid out in the 1984 Law on Transparency were replaced with the 1986 Press Laws. The revised press ownership rules attempted to halt the progression of concentration in the press market by choosing limits that closely resembled the existing market status quo. According to Article 41, companies cannot acquire a new publication if the acquisition boosts their total daily circulation (of all the company's publications) to over 30% nationally. It should be noted that this rule only applies to daily publications and not to weeklies (or other non-daily publications). Also, if a company creates its own new publication, or experiences an increase in circulation of its existing publications, it may exceed the 30% threshold. In 1986 cross-media ownership rules were introduced for the first time. In short, publishers were limited to a daily newspaper circulation of 10% nationally if they own have broadcasting interests. This limit was later raised to 20% (for detail, see below on cross-media ownership).
It should be mentioned that France has traditionally subsidised its press industry (some estimate this to be up to15% of the industry's total turnover). Subsidies are both direct (for political and news coverage) and indirect (lower postal, rail, tax and telecommunication rates).
Broadcasting
Competition law applies to the broadcasting industry as it does to the press industry. Competition law according to Concentration Control Law No. 77-806 and the 1986 Competition Ordinance No. 86-1243 can be applied to broadcasting if no sector specific rules are first applied. The Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel can report any observation of abuse of dominant position which falls outside its jurisdiction to the Competition Advisory Board and Ministry for Economic Affairs and make recommendations for action.
Public service broadcasting was governed by a number of laws in France (in 1945, 1972, 1974, and 1982). Mostly these laws dealt with matters of content and funding. The 1982 Law on Audiovisual Communication (29 July 1982, also known as the Fillioud law) introduced some preliminary limited sector liberalisation. Private radio stations were allowed for the first time and public service television could be commissioned to private companies. The law established France's first regulatory body for independent broadcasting, the Haute Autorité de la Communication Audiovisuelle. Unsurprisingly, the regulatory body experienced many teething problems mainly resulting from its independence being challenged by political objectives.
The1986 Law on Freedom of Communication No. 86-1067 brought in liberalisation of the broadcasting sector. It laid down rules on licensing, media ownership, pluralism, advertising, content and subsidies for audio-visual production. The law established a new broadcasting regulatory body, replacing the Haute Autorité de la Communication Audiovisuelle with the Commisssion Nationale de la Communication et des Libertés. As the Commisssion Nationale de la Communication et des Libertés was found to be overly prone to political influence, it was replaced by the Conseil Supérior de l'Audiovisuel (CSA) in 1988. The Conseil Supérior de l'Audiovisuel has since been established as a fully independent regulatory body and entrusted with powers to issue licences for private radio and television (terrestrial cable and satellite). It is responsible for broadcasting content, advertising, and the allocation of broadcasting subsidies. Public service broadcasters are required to ensure pluralist and diverse representation of societal opinion, and honest and independent news reportage. Private broadcasters are also held to certain obligations regarding pluralism and honesty (as stipulated by the CSA). Content laws as governed by the CSA are relatively stringent in France.
The 1986 Law on Freedom of Communication is the basis for present media regulation in France. Its rules relating to broadcasting have been updated many times by amendments (Lois No. 86-1210, No. 87-588, 88-227, 89-25), decrees (décrets) and decisions (décisions). Growth in the French broadcasting industry and private sector lobbying for deregulation led to the 1994 Broadcasting Law No. 94-88 which substantially loosened the 1986 rules. Therefore the French broadcasting sector is regulated by both the 1986 and 1994 laws and by amendments to these laws. The intervening 1989 Tasca and 1990 Lang laws dealt solely with public service, largely with problems of funding.
Rules on transparency apply to broadcasting as they do to press. Therefore the following company information must be made publicly available:
Capital shares issued in joint-ventures are required to be nominative. All audio-visual companies are required to communicate their accounts to the Registry of the Commercial Courts, in accordance with the principles of general economic law.
Media ownership of broadcasting companies is presently regulated by a number of rules. According to the 1994 Broadcasting Law No. 94-88, an individual or legal entity is limited to owning (directly or indirectly) 49% of the capital of voting rights of a broadcasting company licensed for a national terrestrial television service (previously, according to the 1986 Law No. 86-1067, this limit was set at 25%). Ownership in a second company with a national broadcasting licence is set to 15% of capital and voting rights, and ownership of a third to 5%. The limit for a company licensed for a satellite television service or radio broadcasting is set at 50% of the capital or voting rights. Foreign ownership in any French broadcasting company is limited to 20%.
If the legal stake in a broadcasting company of an individual or legal entity reaches 20% of capital or voting rights, that person must communicate this to the Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel within one month's time. A licence for a broadcasting service may be withdrawn by the CSA if there is a substantial change in capital shares, the board of directors or financial management from when the original licence was granted.
A company can be granted only one licence for a national terrestrial television station for nation-wide broadcasting. A company service is also limited to one satellite licence. A television service, which is broadcast simultaneously by both terrestrial and satellite, is considered to be a single service and requires only one terrestrial licence. Licences for regional and local television are issued separated. A company may only be licensed for one regional television service. The same company (which owns one regional service) can simultaneously own one or more local services. However, its combined services (regional and local) are in this case limited to an audience reach of 6 million viewers. Cable television is limited to an audience reach of 8 million viewers nationally or regionally.
There is no limit to the number of radio networks a company can own, however the laws contain limits for audience reach which is determined by geographical area (see Article 15 of Law No. 94-88). Audience reach for a company radio network is set at 150 million for areas served by numerous radio networks (previously, this limit was 30 million in 1986). Cable radio broadcasting is limited to a combined audience reach of 8 million listeners.
No company can be granted a broadcasting licence (for radio or television) if it already has either: an existing radio station reaching an audience of over 30 million, one or more licences for cable radio and/or cable television reaching an audience of over 6 million, one or more licences for a television service reaching an audience of over 4 million, or owns or controls one or more daily newspapers with a national circulation of over 20%. This restriction applies both nationally and regionally.
Restrictions also apply to companies' advertising interests. The Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel (CSA) when granting licences must take into consideration a company's holdings in advertising companies. The CSA also bans certain companies from advertising on radio or television. Some restrictions relate to content rules (tobacco, for instance), others are meant to guarantee continued advertising sources for newspapers. It should be mentioned that radio stations are also subsidised in France if their profit from advertising and sponsorship is less than 20% less than their total turnover.
In 1996, France ratified its Information Superhighway Law No. 96-299. The law authorises the licensing of trial digital and video-on-demand services. Articles 3 and 4 apply broadcasting laws No. 86-1064 and No. 94-88, but exempt video-on-demand services from Articles 27, 28, 28-1, 70 et 70 of No. 86-1064 (relating to content). Licenses for digital television are to be awarded upon discretion of the CSA. In 1997, the French government drew up a revision of the 1994 Broadcasting Act. However this was never put to vote due to a change in government in June of that year. The new government is presently dissatisfied with the level of media concentration, and has expressed a wish to return to the 1986 media ownership limit of 25% (as opposed to the present level of 49%). However, given the past French experience, it seems that there is little probability of reregulation.
B. GERMANY
Press
Freedom of speech is a basic constitutional right guaranteed by Article 5 of the German federal constitution (the 1949 Grundgesetz). Also according to the Grundgesetz, the German states (Länder) are responsible for cultural policies, which include media policies (Articles 30 and 70). There is therefore no federal press law. The press is regulated by 16 different state press laws (Landespressegesetze). This state level regulation has been balanced by a strong German federal court (Bundeserfassungsgericht) which has made a number of decisions relating to the press industry. Many of these decisions have related to pluralist representation, freedom of expression and assurance of unbiased news reportage. Specific regulation of press ownership has been recommended by the Court, but the Länder have so far considered such regulation as not yet imperative.
According to the Grundgesetz, the federal government is responsible for economic law according to Articles 73, 74, 75 and 79. Therefore competition law is applicable at the federal level, in addition to Länder media ownership law. Competition law was first established with the 1973 Law on Restrictive Practices (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbbeschränkungen) which was updated in 1980. The Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) monitors and rules on abuses of dominant position. The final decision is approved by the Minister for Economic Affairs. Turnover thresholds are lower for the press industry than other sectors (DM 25 million per year for the press sector as opposed to DM 500 million turnover per year for all other sectors). However, these threshold limits have not always been adhered to in decisions taken by the Cartel Office and press concentrations have been allowed above the threshold limits (the European Commission has sometimes protested to this). Two recent decisions in the press sector have been decided negatively by the Cartel Office using these limits however. The Cartel Office has also ruled that public broadcasters do not have an exclusive right to sports programming. (This decision is presently been lobbied against by the European Parliament).
Transparency is required by a number of different laws. The 1987 Commercial Law (Handelsgesetzt updating the Commercial Law of 1897) requires that limited companies provide the names of all members of the board of management and name the seat of the parent company. Consolidated company accounts must be made public. The 1965 federal Corporation Law (Aktiengesezt) further requires companies to make an immediate public announcement when as soon as shareholdings of 25% or 50% are reached. The 1965 Accounting Law (Buchführungsgesetzt) imposes further requirements for publication of company accounts, the extent of publication depending on the legal form a company takes. There are no provisions which require disclosure of financial sources (including advertising).
Germany has a national Press Council (Deutsche Presserat). The Press Council is guaranteed independence in federal law, but is however a private organisation with representatives from employees working in the press industry (in corporatist style: fifty percent of representatives are publisher employees, fifty percent are journalists). The council has established a code for the press (Publizistische Grundsätze-Pressekodex). The code lays down standards of journalistic and editorial independence and makes recommendations to the Länder (many have stipulated that the Länder should restrict press circulation and ownership). The Press Council also monitors press abuses and press concentration, records press complaints (which can be taken to court) and promotes press freedom.
The 16 Länder press laws are all fairly similar in content. All guarantee freedom of establishment for publishers, meaning that there is no licensing. There are no limits on press circulation, nor are there distinctions between different press markets. The laws do include provisions for freedom of expression, dissemination of information, and accuracy of information. Somewhat contradictorily however, the state laws also protect the right of the publisher to specify the political line of the publication (Tendenzschutz). This buffers publishers from pressure from journalist unions, giving owners more control than in other sectors as it opts them out from the German co-determination (Mitbestimmung) law.
Some transparency measures apply: state (Länder) laws require publishers to print a listing in their newspapers about their staff (including the name of the editor and publisher), operation and circulation. No ownership provisions for the press sector are stipulated by the Länder beyond the turnover thresholds laid down in the 1973 Law on Restrictive Practices. Over the years, a number of national press commissions have been set up and carried out studies on the influence of the press. Like the Federal Court, they have recommended ownership legislation as press concentration is viewed as a threat to freedom of information. The Länder however never acted upon these suggestions.
Direct subsidies for the press are forbidden under German law. However, indirect subsidies in the form of preferential postal rates (for news periodicals) and investment loans (for newspapers and magazines) are given under certain conditions (mainly these publications are educational in nature).
Broadcasting
As with regulation of the press, the 16 German Länder are responsible for regulation of broadcasting. Regulation at the state level regulation is again balanced by decisions of the German federal court. Like with the press, many of these court cases have dealt with ensuring plurality of opinion, editorial independence and protection of the media from government influence. But they also have dealt with questions of media ownership and programming rights. In particular, a Court decision ruled that media concentration could affect pluralism and therefore should be should be regulated against by the Länder (this resulted in rules in the interstate broadcasting treaties). The actual model for legislation is left up to the state legislators, but the Court gave some general guidelines. For example, it specified that pluralist requirements (Grundversorgung) could be lessened for private broadcasters if they are heightened for public broadcasters.
Competition law applies to broadcasting, however no special provisions (in terms of lower turnover thresholds) are considered (in contrast to the press). As with the press, German constraint of media concentration in the broadcasting sector has been decidedly lax. The European Commission has protested against many decisions made in favour of media concentration in the broadcasting sector by the German Cartel Office. The European Commission itself has ruled against a number of German concentrations in this sector. The 1965 Corporation and Accounting laws apply to broadcasting as they do to the press. There are no laws which require disclosure of financial sources (including advertising).
Before 1991, the German states (Länder) agreed upon separate treaties for terrestrial and cable television, satellite television, radio broadcasting, the financing of public service broadcasters, and the subsidisation of film and independent production. (It is important to note that no state subsidies have been permitted (past or present) to private broadcasters to limit government influence). In 1987, the first Interstate Treaty on the Restructuring of Broadcasting was ratified. The subsequent 1991 Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting incorporated all previous separate treaties (for radio and public service agreements, etc). Presently, the German states (Länder) regulate their broadcasting with the 1996 Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag).
Some limited media ownership restrictions were imposed on private broadcasters in the 1991 treaty. (These were nation-wide restrictions only). Until 1996, a limit of 50% ownership of shares was imposed on companies holding a licence for nation-wide broadcasting or news channels, and there was a limit to two television stations and two radio stations. These limited restrictions for television were completed scrapped by the 1996 treaty. Under the new rules, a shareholder is allowed to control 100% of the capital of a broadcasting company. (The limit of 50% for national radio stations still applies). There is no longer a limit to the number of television stations one can own. A new policy instrument rather was introduced: that is, that companies are limited to 30% of national audience share of all the combined television stations they own. A Committee for Investigating Concentration in the Media Sector committee (Kommission zur Ermittlung der Konzentration im Medienbereich (KEK)) was set up in 1996 for the licensing and monitoring (also of content) of national broadcasting.
The licensing procedure for local and regional broadcasters remains as it was under the 1991 treaty. The 1991 treaty established state level regulatory bodies (Landesmedienanstalten) which are responsible for the monitoring, licensing and content supervision of private media companies (now on a regional basis). For the public service broadcasters, committees on broadcasting (Rundfunkrat) and administration (Verwaltungsrat) were set up. Members of these public service committees comprise of representatives from relevant societal groups and organisations. The committees act as regulatory bodies for the public service and are responsible for monitoring and content control. The treaty also contained principles of diversity of opinion and independence and objectivity of news programming for both private and public broadcasters.
Applicants for private broadcasting licences on a national and regional level are required to disclose names of the board of directors, of media owners and/or companies and any relationships between and among them. Any changes to board of directors must be reported to the relevant regulatory authority as it may affect licensing. Any changes or transfer of media ownership must be approved by the company board of directors.
C. ITALY
Press
The first Italian law to regulate the publishing industry was the Press Law No. 47 of 1948 (Legge 8 febbraio 1948 n. 47, Disposizioni sulla stampa). The law dealt with registration of publications, fundamental rights of journalists and requirements of editors (right of reply, libel, and moral and civil responsibilities). It contained no provisions on ownership or transparency.
Following a financial crisis in publishing during the 1970s, Italy introduced a new Press Law No. 416 in 1981 (Legge 5 agosto 1981 n. 416 - Disciplina delle imprese editrici e provvidenze per l'editoria). The law outlined allocation rules for subsidies to the industry. It also introduced rules relating to transparency and market share and established a Council for the Press (Garante dell'editoria) (which was replaced by the Press and Broadcasting Authority in 1990, and the Authority for Communications in 1997).
Regarding transparency, title one of the law required publishers to register their newspapers and magazines with the National Press Register (which was replaced in 1997 with the Register for Communications Operators). Publishers (with over 5 full-time journalists) must provide the Authority for Communications with an annual financial statement according to requirements laid out in the law. These financial reports must also be printed in the companies' publications. Any transfer of shares must be reported immediately to the Authority for Communications. Basic sale prices for newspapers are fixed by the government.
Rules on market share restrict publishers to 20 per cent of circulation at the national level and 50 per cent at the regional level. The law forbids any publisher (or majority shareholder) of a newspaper, magazine or a press agency (which employs more than five journalists) to register any holdings abroad. The Publishing Law of 1987 (Legge 25 febbraio 1987 n. 67 - recante disciplina delle imprese editrici e provvidenze per l'editoria) updating the 1981 Press Law states that company shares can be annulled by Parliament if a dominant position is achieved (a company has 6 to 12 months to rectify the situation). The 1987 also removed the rule which fixed newspaper sales prices.
The 1981 Law set out the rules on subsidisation. Indirect subsidies are granted to publishers in the form of lower tax, transport, postal and telecommunications rates. Direct subsidies are given to the non-profit press, journalists unions, minority press and political party press. These subsidies are still in place today.
Competition
Italian competition law did not provide for concentration control until 1990. Prior to this time, the Italian Civil Code of 1942 provided some definitions of dominant position. In particular, Article 2359 of the Italian Civil Code defines dominance (control) as occurring when a legal entity has 50 per cent or more shares of a company's voting rights. The definition did not mean that legal action could be taken to prevent further concentration, but it would be a basis for future legislation.
In 1990, Italy passed its first Competition Law (Legge 10 ottobre 1990 n. 287 - Norme per la tutela della concorrenza e del mercato). The law established Italy’s first Antitrust Authority, which was given its own autonomy. The Italian competition law is by and large a direct translation of European competition law (according to the Treaty of Rome) and the 1989 EU Merger Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJL 395/1, 1989, amended by OJL 257/14, 1990). Article 2 of the Italian competition law directly translates Article 85 of the EEC treaty of Rome, Article 3 translates Article 86 of the EEC treaty, Article 4 translates the third paragraph of Article 85 of the EU treaty (relating to the exemption of cartels).
According to EU rules and Article 2359 of the Italian Civil Code, a company is defined as holding a dominant position when it reaches 50 per cent revenue of a certain market. The law does not prohibit dominant position, but if a company achieves dominant position in a market, the Antitrust Authority can impose certain restrictions on that company’s operations (restricting further expansion, annulling contracts, etc).
Mergers and acquisitions can be prevented under the act: acquisitions, when the gross aggregate national turnover of an acquired company exceeds 69 billion lire (from May 1998); mergers, when the gross turnover of all the companies involved exceeds 689 billion lire (only difference to Europe, dimension of market) (from May 1998). However, the Competition Authority only actually prevented 5 mergers in the 10 years up until 1996. From July 1st, 1996, pre-merger notification was required from companies. Since this time, the Italian competition authority has become much more active in investigating concentrations, particularly in the communications markets.
A further law regulating public utilities markets, introduced in 1995, included a paragraph on regulating competition in utilities markets (Legge 14 novembre 1995 n. 481, Art. 2 - Norme per la concorrenza e la regolazione dei servizi di pubblica utilità). The law established an Authority for the Regulation of Public Utilities which also has powers to ensure competition in utilities markets (Istituzione delle Autorità di regolazione dei servizi di pubblica utilità).
Broadcasting
The 1975 Broadcasting Law (Legge 14 Aprile 1975, n. 103. Nuove Norme in Materia di Diffusione Radiofonica e televisiva) established the public service station, RAI, as a monopoly broadcaster in Italy. The law was challenged in court by private interests. This led to a Constitutional Court ruling of 1976 (Decision, 28.07.1976 n. 202), which opened the market to private interests at the regional level. Private terrestrial television began operation from this time onwards but was unregulated until 1990. Regional broadcasters networked nationally resulting in nationally broadcasting commercial stations. These were in effect illegal until a further constitutional court ruling legitimized national broadcasting by private operators (Decision, 30.07.1984 n.237). By 1990, unrestrained concentration had led to a duopoly with the public service, RAI, and the private broadcaster, Fininvest, sharing roughly 50 per cent each of the market.
Regulation of private broadcasting appeared with the 1990 Broadcasting Act of 6 August 1990 (Legge 6 agosto 1990, n. 223. Disciplina del sistema radiotelevisivo pubblico e privato) which largely implemented the 1989 EU Television Without Frontiers Directive (TWF). The 1990 Act firstly defined the principles of pluralism, diversity in opinion, and the objectivity and impartiality of news coverage. Secondly, it established a new regulatory authority, the Press and Broadcasting Authority (Garante per la radiodiffusione e l'editoria) which replaced the Press Council (Garante dell'editoria). (This authority was replaced in 1997 by the Authority for Communications ). Thirdly, it put into statutory law the court ruling allowing private broadcasters to apply for national broadcasting licences. It then lay down rules relating to transparency and media ownership. The 1990 Act was updated in 1992 (Legge 17.12.1992 n.408), 1993 (Legge 27.10.1993 n. 323), 1994 (Legge 1.03.1994 n.153) and 1997 (Legge 01.07.97, n. 249) following further constitutional court rulings and implementation of European law.
Regarding transparency, companies holding a broadcasting licence must enter the names of their shareholders (over 2 per cent), the number of their respective shares, and the value of those shares, in the Register for Communications Operators (formally the National Register for Radio and Television Companies). The Authority for Communications must be informed of any transfer of shares amounting to over 10 per cent of capital. Companies quoted on the stock exchange (such as Mediaset) must notify any transfer of shares amounting to over 2 per cent of capital. Broadcasting companies must provide an annual financial report of their accounts to the Authority for Communications. Information on company revenue (subscriptions, advertising, sponsorship) must be appended to this annual report.
The 1990 Act has been criticised as it merely confirms the market status quo. However, there are rules for media ownership. The 1990 Act lays down different ownership rules for national and regional television. A company is limited to owning no more than 3 national broadcasting channels. It can only own 2 channels if its existing channels consist of 25 per cent of the number of all national broadcasting channels. A company is also restricted to 25 per cent of the total income of the national communications market (a rule which never worked in practice as the total income of the national communications market could, of course, never be properly defined). Local television licences are limited to 3 regional stations, provided that they cover different broadcasting regions. If the 3 regions border, they may not exceed a combined population of 10 million viewers. Local radio licences are restricted to 7 licences nationally or an audience reach of 10 million, and to 1 licence regionally. Foreign ownership by legal entities situated within the EU (or within countries with similar trade agreements) is not restricted. However, legal entities based externally to the EU are not allowed to own a majority share holding in a broadcasting company.
The 1990 Act restricts cross-media ownership preventing publishers with a circulation of over 16 per cent from owning television stations or with a circulation of 8 per cent from owning more than one station. A publisher with less than 8 per cent combined national circulation is limited to 2 television stations. The holder of a national television licence is prohibited from owning a licence for a local television or radio station (and vice versa). The holder of a local television licence may own a licence for a local radio station, as long as there is no scarcity in the allocation of local frequencies.
Regarding content, the 1990 Act stipulates that a broadcaster needs to guarantee that 4 per cent of its transmission time is of European origin. This holds for the first three years of a company’s licence. After three years, 51 per cent of programming needs to be of European origin, of which 50 per cent should be Italian. The advertising rules contained in TWF are incorporated into the Act. Television and radio advertising cannot surpass 15 per cent of daily broadcasting time, or 18 per cent of hourly broadcasting time Private companies holding national broadcasting licences are required to broadcast a daily news programme.
Indirect subsidies are sometimes granted to broadcasters in the form of lower utility rates (telecommunications, electricity). Direct subsidies are given towards the cost of new agencies (up to 53 per cent of cost). Grants are provided for radio stations belonging to political parties.
In July 1997, the Italian parliament passed the New Media Act No. 249. The Act establishes an Authority for Communications (Autorita per le garanzie nelle comunicazioni). The authority was set up in 1998 replacing the Press and Broadcasting Authority. It is situated with a new Ministry for Communications. Similar to the previous authority, the new Authority issues broadcasting licences and has established a Register for Communications Operators. It will register, however, not just companies with television and radio interests, but all companies with offering communications services. The media ownership limits in the 1990 Act remain the same (at 20 per cent of market share) for the time being, but changes are expected in widening market definitions (to accommodate for market convergence). The new Authority monitors media mergers and acquisitions (across all media, including telecommunications and new services) and draws the attention of the competition authority to any undesired market concentration. It has been quite active already in enforcing competition in the communications field.
The government is presently drawing up proposals to reform the 1981 Press Act. The draft proposal is aimed at liberalising ownership limits and liberalising the press sector to allow for greater concentration and cross-media ownership. Transparency measures are to be tightened.
D. NETHERLANDS
Press
The Netherlands has no specific regulation relating to the press and there are no special provisions for press concentration under competition law. However, Dutch publishing companies practice a form of self-regulation. In 1993, Dutch publishing companies agreed to limit their publications to one-third of the national newspaper market (markets are separated into the regional and national levels). This was agreed through the platform of the national publishing trade association. (Dutch publishers are also regulated by general competition law (see below)). Newspapers (and magazines) guarantee the editorial independence of journalists through internal company "editorial statutes". These are part of the employment contracts, based upon models which have been negotiated between employers and journalists in the form of a collective labour agreement.
Through an independent Press Fund, newspapers which are not economically viable, can receive subsidies (which are levied from a tax on television). Newspapers which are no longer economically viable can only apply for a subsidy or loan if, at the same time, they submit an overview of measure which they intend to take to become viable again within a reasonable period of time. Also new newspapers targeting the general public with general information can apply to the Press Fund. Newspapers were exempt from VAT until 1980 after which VAT was levied at only 6%.
From 1956 all Dutch companies were regulated by competition law: the 1956 Economic Competition Act (No. 401), updated by the 1989 Economic Competition Act (No. 57) and then replaced by the 1997 Competition Act (No. 242). The 1997 Competition Act became effective on 1 January 1998. Under the new law, an autonomous Dutch Competition Authority was established to monitor and prevent instances of dominant position. Abuse of dominant position can be investigated when the combined turnover of the companies or the turnover of the joint venture exceeds ten million Dutch guilders (if core income is received by the supply of goods) or two million Dutch guilders (in all other cases). Also, investigations may take place if eight or more companies are involved a joint venture. If an abuse of dominant position is found, the competition authority may impose a fine of up to 1 million Dutch guilders or 10% of turnover upon a company. Before 1998, decisions of this kind were taken solely by the Dutch Minister for Economic Affairs. Now they are taken independently by the director general of the Competition Authority. Dutch companies are also influenced by Dutch tradition of corporatism which requires notification to trade unions and work councils of any significant stock changes or the possibility of a merger or acquisition.
Broadcasting
The Dutch 1987 Media Act regulated the provision of public service broadcasting and licensed private radio stations. Private television companies existed but were not permitted to broadcast independently, but were contracted to provide public service programming. The Act set content provisions for public service programming: 25% of which needed to be news, 25% entertainment, 20% culture, and 5% education. Each private company granted public service broadcasting time must set up an internal programme charter which states the rights of journalists.
The 1988 Act introduced a new regulatory body, the Commissariaat voor de Media. The Commissariaat voor de Media, is an independent regulatory body which regulates both private and public broadcasting. It is staffed by civil servants and run by a Board of Commissioners (three Commissioners with portfolios are appointed). The Commissariaat is divided into various departments: (1) the Department of Broadcasting Time and Cable (ZKZ) which sets up programme councils and licenses local cable networks (2) the Division of Programme Supervision (PTZ) which regulates advertising, monitors content and deals with prosecutions. (3) the Department of Finance (FTZ) which deals with public service finance. (4) the Chief Management Bureau (BB) which can suggest policy proposals and advises the Board of Commissioners (5) the Secretariat (BAS) for internal administration.
According to the 1988 Act, the Board of Directors of the public service broadcaster (NOS) is advised by a programme committee which is staffed with representatives of social and cultural interest groups. Local and regional authorities have set up councils with representatives of the regions' chief social, cultural, religious organisations which agree on programme policies.
The Netherlands did not permit private television broadcasting until 1990. However, as a small country with many bordering countries, the Netherlands had the unique problem of a high level of cross-border transmissions (often in the Dutch language). By 1989 a large proportion of television audience share went to a Luxembourg satellite broadcaster. The 1990 Media Act attempted to liberalise the domestic private market and promote Dutch production. However, although the 1990 Act amending the 1988 Media Act allowed private broadcasters for the first time, it restricted private broadcasting to cable transmission. All terrestrial frequencies were reserved for the public stations. Private television was to broadcast nationally through local cable networks. Cable licenses are issued by the Ministry for Culture and required for each local authority (of which there are over 700 in the Netherlands). Broadcasting solely at local and regional levels was restricted to public service providers. The 1990 Act contained some provisions on cross media ownership in that any broadcaster with over 60% audience reach, could not own newspaper with beyond 25% national reach. There are no limits on internal ownership of private companies (100% ownership is possible). Private companies must be established in an EU member state. The Act also increased advertising limits for private providers of public service. (Private company) public service broadcasters are limited to 6.5% of broadcasting time whereas private (cable) broadcasters are restricted to 10%.
The 1990 Act requires that broadcasters permit inspection of their accounts to the Commissariaat voor de Media upon request. According to general company law, all companies (also non-media) must publish annual accounts. There is an additional obligation for all companies to report significant stock changes publicly (in a newspaper). Significant stock changes are considered to be when a share holder reaches 5, 10, 25, 50 and 66 per cent share of a company. All shares must be registered nominally.
The 1994 Media Act revised the 1990 Act. The revision of the Act was prompted by a McKinsey consultancy report on the viability of public service television. The 1994 Act loosened programming rules for public service broadcasters, allowing them to better compete with commercial broadcasters. It did not introduce any further private sector liberalisation.
The Netherlands was one of the first European countries to privatise its national telecommunications operator, PTT Telecom, in 1989. Liberalisation of the sector followed in 1995 with licenses for further private operators. The rapid development of telecommunications systems (including wide cable reach) has brought the Dutch government to amend its 1990 Media Act through its new 1998 Telecommunications Law (No. 610, 9 oktober 1998, (No. 610) Telecommunicatiewet: houden regels inzake de telecommunicatie). Rules amending the Media act included the licensing of local and regional level private broadcasters and the provision of new services by public broadcasters.
Press
The UK has no specific regulation relating to the press. However there are special provisions for press concentration under the 1973 Fair Trading Act. A transfer in ownership of a newspaper with more than 500,000 copies daily circulation must be approved by the Minister for Trade and Industry. The Minister can also block a transfer of a newspaper with less than 50,000 daily circulation. In making a decision, the Minister must take into consideration the public interest (this is a so-called "public interest test"). In practice, this of course can be arbitrary and possibly political motivated. Otherwise, general competition law applies to market concentrations.
Under UK competition law, market concentration is limited to 25% of a relevant market. Likewise, a concentration can be blocked if it totals over £30 million. Investigations are conducted by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT). Upon the advice of Director of Fair Trading, the Minister for Trade and Industry decides whether further investigations are needed. If so, these are carried out by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The MMC decides whether a dominant position would occur and recommends either a block or changes to the concentration. A final decision is taken in Parliament.
It should be noted that political considerations have often ridden roughshod over national competition law. For example, a press market concentration was exempted from competition law during 1981 when News International was permitted to buy The Times and Sunday Times from Thomson Ltd. This development was obviously politically motivated as News International at the time supported political line of the Conservative government.
Broadcasting
Cross-media ownership has traditionally been regulated to a greater extent than in the rest of Europe with a clear separation of markets. The UK has been slow to liberalise commercial terrestrial television. ITV, Channel three, (the first commercial channel) was first licensed in 1955. However, it was held to strict content requirements to protect pluralism, as was the BBC. Channel four was licensed in 1982 as a "minority" channel. It was further restricted in terms of content and some of its advertising revenue was allocated to ITV. Strict regulation of Channels three and four meant that they could be considered as public service providers, only commercially funded. The Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) regulated both public and private broadcasters. The 1990 Broadcasting Act first introduced some sector deregulation.
Under the 1990 Broadcasting Act, ITV licence holders were permitted to own up to 20% in a company owning another ITV licence. The Act stipulated that the ITV companies would in future have to bid for their licences (following the Act, 3 of the 15 ITV companies lost their licences). Permission was granted for a fifth terrestrial television station (which finally aired in 1997).
The 1990 Act established the Radio Authority and the Department of National Heritage was established. The Independent Television Commission (ITC) was also set up (replacing both the IBA and Cable Authority). The government in power directly makes appointments to the ITC. For this reason, its independence has been questioned. However, most appointments are drawn not from political parties, but from industry. As many ITC appointments traditionally came directly from ITV companies, the third channel has often been seen as self-regulated. (With the later establishment of channel five in 1997, and more advertising independence being granted to channel four, this idea has changed somewhat). ITC decision-makers are often rotated, the chairman being the only permanent member of staff.
It should be mentioned that, as with the press, the permitting of broadcasting market concentration has been seen to be politically motivated. For example, the Conservative government opted News International out of UK media ownership legislation by allowing BSkyB to purchase BSB in 1990. Once again, this development was seen to be politically motivated as News International at the time supported political line of the Conservative government.
With the 1996 Broadcasting Act, rules governing cross-media ownership were relaxed permitting national newspapers with less than 20% market share to own one private broadcaster (radio, television or satellite) and have full control of non-domestic satellite broadcasters. A publisher can also own up to three local radio licences if it has less than 20% of local circulation (subject to a public interest test). If a local newspaper has between 20 and 50% of local circulation it can only own one local FM radio station and one AM station. If a local newspaper has over 50% of local circulation it can only own one local radio station (subject to a public interest test). Terrestrial broadcasters can own up to 20% stake in national newspapers and non-domestic satellite licences. Regional publishers are allowed to own one regional broadcaster, as long as there is no major overlap between the licensed area and the paper's circulation area.
A new market measurement was introduced in the Act to limit audience share of broadcasters to 15% (for both television and radio stations). This idea was adopted from suggestions put forth by the European Commission in a 1994 Green paper. So there is no limit on license ownership, as long as the combination of company ownership and their corresponding license-holding does not exceed 15%. The measurement is based upon the ownership of companies and their corresponding audience share, not on channels (as in Germany). Although market concentrations have taken place, ITV channels continue to have complicated ownership structures created by past UK legislation. ITV is separated into regional divisions which are licensed to 18 companies. These ITV companies in turn are owned by other investors in a complicated arrangement of cross-holdings. No legal entity can control more than one ITV channel for the same area. Control of both an ITV licence and Channel five is not allowed.
There is a restriction of ownership of one FM and one AM station licence in a local area. Three licences may be granted subject to a public interest test. No one can own more than one national radio station.
Also under 1996 Broadcasting Act, the BBC's licence fee was upheld and it was given permission to expand commercially. The Department of National Heritage became the Department of Culture, Media and Sport.
Telecommunications has traditionally been heavily regulated. Since its privatisation, British Telecomm (BT) has been under direct control of the Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL). BT's expansion is allowed only on a case by case basis. BT has not been permitted cable interests (until some limited recently) and other cable companies were encouraged to invest in telephony to break up the monopoly of the privatised BT. Most of these cable/telephone companies are American. A new broadcasting bill is anticipated from the UK Labour government which will allow competition between broadcasters and telecommunications operators.
III. Country Analyses (using the study template threshed out in part I)
Country analysis: France
France guarantees the freedom of speech in its 1789 Declaration of Human Rights (Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen). Article 11 states:
La libre communication des pensées et des opinions est un des droits les plus précieux de l'homme: tout citoyen peut donc parler, écrire, imprimer librement, sauf à répondre de l'abus de cette liberté, dans les cas déterminés par la loi.
(The free communication of thought and opinion is one of the most precious of human rights. Each citizen may therefore speak, write, and print freely, as long as there is no abuse of this freedom as determined by cases of law).
B. Legislation ensuring transparency of media holdings
According to the 1984 French Law on Transparency (Law No. 84-937), capital shares issued in joint-ventures for all companies are required to be nominative (share holders must be named).
Article 36 of the 1986 Freedom of Communication (Law No. 86-1067) specifies that capital shares issued in all media company undertakings must be nominative. According to Articles 75 and 76, fines of FF 6,000 to 120,000 for individual owners, or FF 10,000 to 40,000 for senior executives of limited companies (sociétés) can be issued for any digression of Article 36.
The 1986 Press Law (Law No. 86-1210) contains many rules relating to transparency. According to Article 37 of Law No. 86-1067, the following company information should be made publicly available:
All French companies are required to communicate their accounts to the Registry of the Commercial Courts, in accordance with the principles of general economic law.
When applying for a terrestrial audio-visual licence, a company must inform the Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel of their proposed media revenue. Media revenue is also made visible through the registration of company accounts to Commercial Courts.
According to the 1994 Broadcasting Law No. 94-88, if the legal stake in a broadcasting company of an individual or legal entity reaches 20% of capital or voting rights, that legal entity must communicate this to the Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel within one month's time. A licence for a broadcasting service may be withdrawn by the CSA if there is a substantial change in capital shares, the board of directors or financial management from when the original licence was granted.
Article 39 of the 1986 Press Law (Law No. 86-1210) requires that any proposed transfer of capital amounting to one-third of voting rights must be disclosed to a publication's readership.
C. Legislation concerning media ownership
Media ownership of broadcasting companies is presently regulated by a number of rules. According to the 1994 Broadcasting Law No. 94-88, an individual or legal entity is limited to owning (directly or indirectly) 49% of the capital of voting rights of a broadcasting company licensed for a national terrestrial television service (previously, according to the 1986 Law No. 86-1067, this limit was set at 25%). Ownership in a second company with a national broadcasting licence is set to 15% of capital and voting rights, and ownership of a third to 5%. The limit for a company licensed for a satellite television service or radio broadcasting is set at 50% of the capital or voting rights.
A company can be granted only one licence for a national terrestrial television station for nation-wide broadcasting. A company service is also limited to one satellite licence. A television service, which is broadcast simultaneously by both terrestrial and satellite, is considered to be a single service and requires only one terrestrial licence. Licences for regional and local television are issued separated. A company may only be licensed for one regional television service. The same company (which owns one regional service) can simultaneously own one or more local services. However, its combined services (regional and local) are in this case limited to an audience reach of 6 million viewers. Cable television is limited to an audience reach of 8 million viewers nationally or regionally.
There is no limit to the number of radio networks a company can own, however the laws contain limits for audience reach which is determined by geographical area (see Article 15 of Law No. 94-88). Audience reach for a company radio network is set at 150 million for areas served by numerous radio networks (previously, this limit was 30 million in 1986). Cable radio broadcasting is limited to a combined audience reach of 8 million listeners.
According to Article 41 of the 1986 Press Law, companies cannot acquire a new publication if the acquisition boosts their total daily circulation (of all the company's publications) to over 30% nationally. It should be noted that this rule only applies to daily publications and not to weeklies (or other non-daily publications). Also, if a company creates its own new publication, or experiences an increase in circulation of its existing publications, it may exceed the 30% threshold.
There is no requirement to have societal representatives within general boards of commercial companies. Membership of governing boards of public television are required to be representatively pluralistic (according to Article 30 of the 1994 Broadcasting Act).
No company can be granted a broadcasting licence (for radio or television) if it already has either: an existing radio station reaching an audience of over 30 million, one or more licences for cable radio and/or cable television reaching an audience of over 6 million, one or more licences for a television service reaching an audience of over 4 million, or owns or controls one or more daily newspapers with a national circulation of over 20%. This restriction applies both nationally and regionally.
Publishers are limited to a daily newspaper circulation of 20% nationally if they own have broadcasting interests.
Foreign investors are limited to a 20% share of the capital or voting rights of any media company broadcasting or publishing in the French language.
France has introduced a "universal service financing mechanism" to which new entrants to the telecommunications are required to contribute. The fund which has just been introduced will ensure that there is no market closure in the telecommunications field by balancing tariff costs between users.
1. Cartel, merger and acquisition regulation
The 1986 Competition Ordinance No. 86-1243 (l'ordonnance no 86-1243), stipulates that a dominant position is established when the companies involved in a merger or acquisition achieve a composite of 25% of a relevant market or a combined turnover of over 7 billion French francs.
The Competition Advisory Board (Conseil de la Concurrence) monitors markets and reports any legal digressions to the Ministry for Economic Affairs. The ministry then invites parties partaking in a merger or acquisition voluntarily to request ministerial permission. It should be noted that the Competition Advisory Board is not a regulatory body and therefore not an independent decision-maker. Any decisions taken on anti-competitive behaviour are essentially made by the Minister for Economic Affairs. Since the November 1986 Press Law, general competition law has not ordinarily been utilised in connection with the press industry as the market is now governed by specific ownership rules (as described below). General competition rules can of course be employed if specific media ownership rules are not applied to a market concentration.
Competition law applies to the broadcasting industry as it does to the press industry. Competition law according to Concentration Control Law No. 77-806 and the 1986 Competition Ordinance No. 86-1243 can be applied to broadcasting if no sector specific rules are first applied. The Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel can report any observation of abuse of dominant position which falls outside its jurisdiction to the Competition Advisory Board and Ministry for Economic Affairs and make recommendations for action.
France has traditionally subsidized its press industry (some estimates put this at15% of the industry's total turnover). Subsidies are both direct (for political and news coverage) and indirect (up to 50% reduction in postal, rail, tax and telecommunication rates).
Direct government subsidies are also given for audio-visual production and broadcasting. The Conseil Supérior de l'Audiovisuel is responsible for the allocation of broadcasting subsidies. Mostly these are related to content production.
Commercial radio stations are also directly subsidized in France if their profit from advertising and sponsorship is less than 20% less than their total turnover.
The CSA bans certain companies from advertising on radio or television. Some restrictions relate to content rules (tobacco, for instance), others are meant to guarantee continued advertising sources for newspapers.
The Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel (CSA) must take into consideration a company's holdings in advertising companies when granting licences.
Journalists are protected by a conscience clause. Both broadcasting and press companies are required to consult journalist representatives if there is a significant change in editorial line or company stock.
French laws on public television require that news coverage be honest and impartial. Commercial companies are also obligated to honesty and impartiality in news coverage under the separate Press and Broadcasting Acts.
Pluralist representation of societal groups is warranted through public service broadcasting.
According to their individual licence agreements, commercial television companies must produce a certain percentage of in-house programming as agreed with the Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel.
Regional and local television and radio content production is subsidised to assure pluralist representation.
Law No. 92-652 of 13 July 1992 (amending law no. 84-610 of 16 July 1984) guarantees the availability of sports highlights and forbids the practice of "freezing" rights. A "code of good conduct" is enforced by the CSA.
The Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel (CSA.) in licensing Canal Plus imposed the restriction that the company could not acquire the exclusive rights to broadcast the following events: Olympic Winter Games, Olympic Summer Games, Tour de France; World Cup Football Matches, European Cup Football Matches and Five Nations Rugby matches in which the French national team takes part; the Final of French Football Cup (decision in the Journal Official 3.6.95).
The Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel can revoke licences for radio or television stations following any breach of media ownership laws. In the case of potential abuse of dominant position, the Minister for Economic Affairs (upon advice from either the CSA, the Competition Advisory Board or the Ministry for Economic Affairs) can block a concentration in the market.
K. Future regulatory proposals and trends
France is presently issuing trial licenses for digital and video-on-demand services according to its 1996 Information Superhighway Law No. 96-299.. Articles 3 and 4 apply broadcasting laws No. 86-1064 and No. 94-88, but exempt video-on-demand services from Articles 27, 28, 28-1, 70 et 70 of No. 86-1064 (relating to content). Licenses for digital television are awarded upon discretion of the CSA.
In 1997, the French government drew up a revision of the 1994 Broadcasting Act. However this was never put to vote due to a change in government in June of that year. The new government is presently dissatisfied with the level of media concentration, and has expressed a wish to return to the 1986 media ownership limit of 25% (as opposed to the present level of 49%). However, it seems that there is little probability of reregulation due to the virtual impossibility of enforcing de-concentration.
Country Analysis: Germany
Freedom of speech is a basic constitutional right guaranteed by the German federal constitution (the 1949 Grundgesetz). Article 5.1 on the freedom of opinion, states:
Artikel 5: Meinungsfreiheit (1) Jeder hat das Recht, seine Meinung in Wort, Schrift und Bild frei zu äußern und zu verbreiten und sich aus allgemein zugänglichen Quellen ungehindert zu unterrichten. Die Pressefreiheit und die Freiheit der Berichterstattung durch Rundfunk und Film werden gewährleistet. Eine Zensur findet nicht statt.
(Everyone has the right to express and disseminate his opinion in speech, writing and illustration and to inform himself with universally obtainable sources unhindered. The freedom of the press and reporting through broadcasting and film are guaranteed. Censorship will not take place).
Germany has no rules requiring shares to be nominative.
The 1987 Commercial Law (Handelsgesetzt updating the Commercial Law of 1897) requires that limited companies provide the names of all members of the board of management and name the seat of the parent company.
Applicants for private broadcasting licences on a national and regional level are required to disclose names of the board of directors, of media owners and/or companies and any relationships between and among them.
The 1987 Commercial Law requires that consolidated company accounts be made public.
The 1965 Accounting Law (Buchführungsgesetzt) imposes requirements for publication of company accounts, the extent of publication
depending on the legal form a company takes.State (Länder) press laws require publishers to print a listing in their newspapers about their staff (including the name of the editor and publisher), operation and circulation.
There are n
o laws in Germany which require full disclosure of financial sources (including advertising).
The 1965 federal Corporation Law (Aktiengesezt) requires companies to make an immediate public announcement when as soon as shareholdings of 25% or 50% are reached.
The 1996 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty requires that any changes to a broadcasting company's board of directors must be reported to the relevant regulatory authority as it may affect licensing. The board of directors must approve any changes or transfer of media ownership.
C. Legislation concerning media ownership
According to the Grundgesetz, the German states (Länder) are responsible for cultural policies, which include media policies (Articles 30 and 70). There is therefore no federal press law. The press is regulated by 16 different state press laws (Landespressegesetze).
All 16 Länder Press Laws guarantee freedom of establishment for publishers, meaning that there is no licensing. There are no limits on press circulation, nor are there distinctions between different press markets.
No ownership p
rovisions for the press sector are stipulated by the Länder beyond the turnover thresholds laid down in the 1973 Law on Restrictive Practices. Over the years, a number of national press commissions have been set up and carried out studies on the influence of the press. As has the Federal Court, they have recommended ownership legislation as press concentration is viewed as a threat to freedom of information. The Länder however never acted upon these suggestions.Until 1996, a limit of 50% ownership of shares was imposed on companies holding a
licence for nation-wide broadcasting or news channels, and there was a limit to two television stations and two radio stations. These limited restrictions for television were dropped in the recent 1996 Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting. Under the new rules, a shareholder is allowed to control 100% of the capital of a broadcasting company. (The limit of 50% for national radio stations still applies). There is no longer a limit to the number of television stations one can own. A new policy instrument rather was introduced: that is, that companies are limited to 30% of national audience share of all the combined television stations they own.The licensing procedure for local and regional broadcasters remains as it was under the 1991 Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting. The 1991 treaty established state level regulatory bodies (Landesmedienanstalten) which are responsible for the monitoring, licensing and content supervision of private media companies (on a local and regional basis).
There are no national cross media ownership restrictions in Germany. However, the Länder hold the right to restrict shareholdings of publishers in local or regional broadcasters.
3. Foreign ownership/investment rules
There are no limits on foreign ownership of media companies, but broadcasting companies must be established in Germany.
Germany has not yet implemented the European ONP directive.
According to the Grundgesetz, the federal government is responsible for economic law according to Articles 73, 74, 75 and 79. Therefore competition law is applicable at the federal level, in addition to Länder media ownership law. Competition law was first established with the 1973
Law on Restrictive Practices (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbbeschränkungen) which was updated by the 1980 Law on Restrictive Practices.
Turnover thresholds are lower for the press industry than other economic sectors
(DM 25 million per year for the press sector as opposed to DM 500 million turnover per year for all other sectors). However, these threshold limits have not always been adhered to in decisions taken by the Cartel Office and press concentrations have been allowed above the threshold limits (the European Commission has sometimes protested to this). Two recent decisions in the press sector have been decided negatively by the Cartel Office using these limits however.Competition law applies to broadcasting, however no special provisions (in terms of lower turnover thresholds) are considered (in contrast to the press). As with the press, German constraint of media concentration in the broadcasting sector has been decidedly lax. The European Commission has protested against many decisions made in favour of media concentration in the broadcasting sector by the German Cartel Office. The European Commission itself has ruled against a number of German concentrations in this sector.
Direct subsidies for the press are forbidden under German law. However, indirect subsidies in the form of preferential postal rates (for news periodicals) and investment loans (for newspapers and magazines) are given under certain conditions (mainly these publications are classified as educational).
No state subsidies have been permitted (past or present) to private broadcasters in order to limit government influence. However, the German Länder provide subsidies to independent production companies for films and programming. Funding is agreed upon by the Länder in the Interstate Treaties on Broadcasting (Rundfunkstaatsverträge). The financing of public service broadcasters is also agreed upon in the Rundfunkstaatsverträge.
There are no advertising restrictions in Germany.
Accountability and independence of reporting are guaranteed by the 16 Länder press and broadcasting laws. The laws include provisions for freedom of expression, dissemination of information, and accuracy of information. Somewhat contradictorily however, the state press laws protect the right of publishers to specify the political line of the publication (Tendenzschutz). This buffers publishers from pressure from journalist unions, giving owners more control than in other sectors as it opts them out from the German co-determination (Mitbestimmung) law.
The German federal court (Bundeserfassungsgericht) has made a number of decisions relating to the press industry. Many of these decisions have related to pluralist representation, freedom of expression and assurance of unbiased news reportage. Specific regulation of press ownership has been recommended by the Federal Court, but the Länder have so far considered such regulation as not imperative.
The 1996 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty contained principles of diversity of opinion and independence and objectivity of news programming for both private and public broadcasters.
The 1991 and 1996 Interstate Treaties established public service broadcasters committees on broadcasting (Rundfunkrat) and administration (Verwaltungsrat). Members of these public service committees comprise of representatives from relevant societal groups and organisations. The committees act as regulatory bodies for the public service and are responsible for monitoring and content control.
The Landesmedienanstalten, which regulate private broadcasters, similarly include representatives from relevant societal groups and organisations.
The 1996 Inter-State Agreement on Broadcasting transposes the Council of Europe Recommendation 5 (1991) on "The right to short reporting on major events where exclusive rights for their television broadcast have been acquired in a transfrontier context". Article 4 of the Agreement states that every licensed broadcaster in Europe is entitled to short coverage free of charge, for its own broadcasting purposes, of functions and events which are open to the public and of general interest. This rule is currently under challenge in the German Constitutional Court.
Many previous individual cases of private programming rights have been dealt with by the German Federal Court.
The Cartel Office has also ruled that public broadcasters do not have an exclusive right to sports programming.
Concentration and media ownership laws are agreed by the 16 state (Länder). In 1987, the first Interstate Treaty on the Restructuring of Broadcasting was ratified. The subsequent 1991 Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting incorporated all previous separate treaties (for radio and public service agreements, etc). Presently, the German states (Länder) regulate their broadcasting with the 1996 Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag).
A Committee for Investigating Concentration in the Media Sector committee (Kommission zur Ermittlung der Konzentration im Medienbereich (KEK)) was set up by the 1996 Interstate Treaty on Braodcasting for the licensing and monitoring (also of content) of national broadcasting. It has the power to revoke broadcasting licences if any breach of a state 's law occurs.
The Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) monitors and rules on abuses of dominant position. The final decision is approved by the Minister for Economic Affairs. Mergers can be prevented and fines can be imposed.
Germany has a national Press Council (Deutsche Presserat). The Press Council is guaranteed independence in federal law, but is however a private organisation with representatives from employees working in the press industry (corporatist style: fifty percent of representatives are publisher employees, fifty percent are journalists). The council has established a code for the press (Publizistische Grundsätze-Pressekodex). The code lays down standards of journalistic and editorial independence and makes recommendations to the Länder (many have stipulated that the Länder should restrict press circulation and ownership). The Press Council also monitors press abuses and press concentration, records press complaints (which can be taken to court) and promotes press freedom. However, it has no regulatory powers.
K. Future regulatory proposals and trends
There has been a clear trend towards complete market liberalisation and deregulation in Germany governed by de-regulatory competition between the Länder as they seek to attract media investment. However, there is also a regulatory tug-of-war between the Länder, responsible for media policy, and the federal government, responsible for telecommunications policy. As convergence of technology means that media markets will be increasingly regulated as telecommunications in the future, the Länder have to surrender their regulatory jurisdiction to the federal government.
Country analysis: Italy
Freedom of expression is guaranteed in Article 21 of the Italian Constitution.
B. Legislation ensuring transparency of media holdings
Title one of the 1981 Press Law requires publishers to register their newspapers and magazines with the Register for Communications Operators (with over 5 full-time journalists) must provide the Authority for Communications with an annual financial statement according to requirements laid out in the law. These financial reports must also be printed in the companies' publications yearly .
Companies holding a broadcasting licence must enter the names of their shareholders (over 2 per cent), the number of their respective shares, and the value of those shares, in the Register for Communications Operators.
Publishing companies must provide the Authority for Communciations with an annual financial statement according to requirements laid out in the 1981 Press law. Publishers must print these financial reports in their publications.
Broadcasting companies must provide an annual financial report of their accounts to the Authority for Communications. Information on company revenue (subscriptions, advertising, sponsorship) must be appended to this annual report
Any transfer of shares for publising companies must be reported immediately to the Authority for Communications by media companies.
The Authority for Communications must be informed of any transfer of shares for broadcasting companies amounting to over 10 per cent of capital. Companies quoted on the stock exchange (such as Mediaset) must notify any transfer of shares amounting to over 2 per cent of capital.
C. Legislation concerning media ownership
Rules on market share (laid down in the 1981 Press Law) restrict publishers to 20 per cent of circulation at the national level and 50 per cent at the regional level.
The 1990 Broadcasting Act lays down different ownership rules for national and regional television. A company is limited to owning no more than 3 national broadcasting channels. It can only own 2 channels if its existing channels consist of 25 per cent of the number of all national broadcasting channels. A company is also restricted to 25 per cent of the total income of the national communications market (a rule which never worked in practice as the total income of the national communications market could never be properly defined). Local television licences are limited to 3 regional stations, provided that they cover different broadcasting regions. If the 3 regions border, they may not exceed a combined population of 10 million viewers. Local radio licences are restricted to 7 licences nationally or an audience reach of 10 million, and to 1 licence regionally.
A company's broadcasting licence must be reconfirmed there are significant changes during a one year period (2 per cent or more for incorporated companies, otherwise 10 per cent).
The Broadcasting Act of 6 August 1990 established a Public Consultation Committee which now operates within the Authority of Communications.
The 1990 Broadcasting Act restricts cross-media ownership preventing publishers with a circulation of over 16 per cent from owning television stations or with a circulation of 8 per cent from owning more than one station. A publisher with less than 8 per cent combined national circulation is limited to 2 television stations. The holder of a national television licence is prohibited from owning a licence for a local television or radio station (and vice versa). The holder of a local television licence may own a licence for a local radio station, as long as there is no scarcity in the allocation of local frequencies
The 1981 Press law forbids any publisher (or majority shareholder) of a newspaper, magazine or a press agency (which employs more than five journalists) to register any holdings abroad.
The 1990 Broadcasting Act does not restrict foreign ownership by legal entities situated within the EU (or within countries with similar trade agreements). However, legal entities based externally to the EU are not allowed to own a majority share holding in a broadcasting company.
Licenses for broadcasting are only issued to those broadcasting from Italy.
In 1999, Italy set up a fund for universal service to guarantee new entrants access to telecommunications networks. The fund is based upon the results of telecommunications operators in 1998.
1. Cartel, merger and acquisition regulation
Mergers and acquisitions can be prevented under the 1990 Competition Act: acquisitions, when the gross aggregate national turnover of an acquired company exceeds 69 billion lire (from May 1998); mergers, when the gross turnover of all the companies involved exceeds 689 billion lire (from May 1998). From July 1st, 1996, pre-merger notification was required from companies.
The Italian Civil Code of 1947 provides a definition of dominant position. In particular, Article 2359 of the Civil Code defines dominance (control) as occurring when a legal entity has 50 per cent or more shares of a company's voting rights.
The 1990 Competition Law defines a holding as dominant when it reaches 50 per cent revenue of a certain market. The law does not prohibit dominant position, but if a company achieves dominant position in a market, the Antitrust Authority can impose certain restrictions on that company’s operations (restricting further expansion, annulling contracts, etc)
The 1981 Press Law sets out the rules on subsidisation of the press. Indirect subsidies are granted to publishers in the form of lower tax, transport, postal and telecommunications rates. Direct subsidies are given to the non-profit press, journalists unions, minority press and political party press.
Indirect subsidies are sometimes granted to broadcasters in the form of lower utility rates (telecommunications, electricity). Direct subsidies are given towards the cost of new agencies (up to 53 per cent of cost). Grants are provided for radio stations belonging to political parties.
The advertising rules contained in TWF are incorporated into the Act. Television and radio advertising cannot surpass 15 per cent of daily broadcasting time, or 18 per cent of hourly broadcasting time Private companies holding national broadcasting licences are required to broadcast a daily news programme.
Advertisers are limited to exclusive rights agreements with newspapers. They can only advertise in daily newspapers providing they do not exceed more 30 per cent of the circulation market (through the use of their combined newspaper use). This percentage is lowered to 20 per cent if the advertiser owns or controls a publishing company.
Advertisers owned or controlled by broadcasting companies are restricted in their advertising practices. They cannot advertise on more than either three national channels. They can instead advertise on two national channels and three local channels or one national channel and six local channels.
The 1981 Press Law guarantees fundamental rights of journalists and requirements of editors (right of reply, libel, and moral and civil responsibilities).
The 1990 Broadcasting Act defines the principles of pluralism and diversity in opinion.
1. Impartiality of news coverage
The 1981 Press Law ensures that there should be impartiality and objectivity in the coverage of the news.
The 1990 Broadcasting Act ensures the objectivity and impartiality of news coverage.
2. Public Interest Provisions (regional programming, representation of societal groups, etc.)
The 1981 Press Law No. 416 allocates funding for press representating regional and certain societal interests (this includes, however, political parties).
The 1990 Broadcasting Act stipulates that a broadcaster needs to guarantee that 4 per cent of its transmission time is of European origin. This holds for the first three years of a company’s licence. After three years, 51 per cent of programming needs to be of European origin, of which 50 per cent should be Italian.
The press and broadcasting coverage of the major political parties is subsidized in Italy. This policy has been much in question.
The new communications authority has listed events of special importance or general interest for which exclusive broadcasting rights cannot be acquired or that must be broadcast live (or, as the case may be, within the following 24 hours) and in unencrypted form.
The Publishing Law of 1987 states that company shares can be annulled by Parliament if a dominant position is achieved in publishing (a company has 6 to 12 months to rectify the situation).
The Competition Authority can impose certain restrictions on that company’s operations (restricting further expansion, annulling contracts, etc) if a dominant position is identified. The Authority an also prevent Mergers and acquisitions which exceed thesholds defined in 1996.
The Authority for Communications monitors media mergers and acquisitions (across all media, including telecommunications and new services) and draws the attention of the competition authority to any undesired market concentration. The Competition Authority can then take action upon recommendation from the Authority for Communications. The Authority for Communications can also suggest policy recommendations to the Parliament concerning the media sector.
K. Future regulatory proposals and trends
The government is presently drawing up proposals to reform the 1981 Press Act. The draft proposal is aimed at liberalising ownership limits and liberalising the press sector to allow for greater concentration and cross-media ownership. Transparency measures are to be tightened.
Country analysis: Netherlands
The Netherlands guarantees the freedom of speech in Article 7 of the 1983 of the Constitution of the Netherlands.
B. Legislation ensuring transparency of media holdings
All shares must be registered nominally.
According to general company law, all companies (also non-media) must publish annual accounts.
A company must permit inspection of their accounts to the Commissariaat voor de Media upon request. Media revenue is also made visible through the publication of company accounts.
According to company law, all companies must report significant stock changes publicly (in a newspaper). Significant stock changes are considered to be when a share holder reaches 5, 10, 25, 50 and 66 per cent share of a company.
C. Legislation concerning media ownership
Dutch publishing companies practice self-regulation of market share of the press. In 1993, Dutch publishing companies agreed to limit their publications to one-third of the national newspaper market.
Private radio stations are licensed according to provisions under the Dutch 1988 Media Act.
The1990 Media Act allowed private television broadcasters for the first time, but it restricted private broadcasting to cable transmission. All terrestrial frequencies were reserved for the public stations. Private television was to broadcast nationally through local cable networks. Cable licenses are issued by the Ministry for Culture and required for each local authority (of which there are over 700 in the Netherlands). Broadcasting solely at local and regional levels was restricted to public service providers.
The 1990 Media Act contained some provisions on cross media ownership in that any broadcaster with over 60% audience reach, could not own newspaper with beyond 25% national reach. There are no limits on internal ownership of private companies (100% ownership is possible).
Private companies must be established in an EU member state according to the 1988 Media Act.
The Netherlands has not yet implemented the European ONP directive.
1. Cartel, merger and acquisition regulation
If an abuse of dominant position is found, the Dutch competition authority may impose a fine of up to 1 million Dutch guilders or 10% of turnover upon a company. Before 1998, decisions of this kind were taken solely by the Dutch Minister for Economic Affairs. Now they are taken independently by the director general of the Competition Authority. Dutch companies are also influenced by Dutch tradition of corporatism which requires notification to trade unions and work councils of any significant stock changes or the possibility of a merger or acquisition.
There are special provisions for press concentration under competition law.
2. Measurements and methodology to determine dominance
Abuse of dominant position can be investigated when the combined turnover of the companies or the turnover of the joint venture exceeds ten million Dutch guilders (if core income is received by the supply of goods) or two million Dutch guilders (in all other cases). Also, investigations may take place if eight or more companies are involved a joint venture.
Through an independent Press Fund, newspapers which are not economically viable, receive subsidies (which are levied from a tax on television). Newspapers were exempt from VAT until 1980 after which VAT was levied at only 6%.
The 1990 Act sets advertising limits for private providers of public service. (Private company) public service broadcasters are limited to 6.5% of broadcasting time whereas private (cable) broadcasters are restricted to 10%.
Newspapers and magazines voluntarily guarantee the editorial independence of journalists through internal company "editorial statutes". (This is part of the Dutch self-regulation of the press.
Editorial independence in broadcasting is guaranteed in the 1988 Media Act. Each private company granted public service broadcasting time establishes an internal programme charter which states the rights of journalists.
Required in the 1998 Media Act.
According to the 1988 Media Act, the Board of Directors of the public service broadcaster (NOS) is advised by a programme committee which is staffed with representatives of social and cultural interest groups. Local and regional authorities have set up councils with representatives of the regions' chief social, cultural, religious organisations which agree on programme policies.
The 1998 Act set content provisions for public service programming: 25% of which needed to be news, 25% entertainment, 20% culture, and 5% education.
The Media Decree (1998) guarantees that highlights of certain events are available to public service broadcasters.
The 1988 Media Act the Commissariaat voor de Media. The Commissariaat voor de Media, is an independent regulatory body which regulates both private and public broadcasting. It is staffed by civil servants and run by a Board of Commissioners (three Commissioners with portfolios are appointed). The Commissariaat is divided into various departments: (1) the Department of Broadcasting Time and Cable (ZKZ) which sets up programme councils and licenses local cable networks (2) the Division of Programme Supervision (PTZ) which regulates advertising, monitors content and deals with prosecutions. (3) the Department of Finance (FTZ) which deals with public service finance. (4) the Chief Management Bureau (BB) which can suggest policy proposals and advises the Board of Commissioners (5) the Secretariat (BAS) for internal administration. The present Commissioners are the chairman, Helmer Koetje (with portfolios for departments 1, 4 and 5) Lennart van der Meulen (Koetje (with a portfolio for department 2) and Inge Brakman (with a portfolio for department 3).
The 1990 Act requires that broadcasters permit inspection of their accounts to the Commissariaat voor de Media upon request.
K. Future regulatory proposals and trends
The Netherlands introduced a new Telecommunications Act in October 1998. Rules in the Act amended the 1988 Media act. These included the licensing of local and regional level private broadcasters and the provision of new services by public broadcasters.
Country Analysis: UK
The UK does not have a constitution. Therefore it has no constitutional right relating to the freedom of speech. The UK also has no specific law protecting the freedom of speech. It does however have laws relating to the freedom of speech such as laws against defamation and racial provocation. A number of court cases have dealt with the freedom of expression.
B. Legislation ensuring transparency of media holdings
When applying for a licence to the Independent Television Commission and Radio Authority, companies must provide full information about their owners and shareholders.
All UK public companies must provide a public register of shareholders. Those with over 3% stock must be named under company law.
2. Requirements to disclose company accounts
Limited companies must file their accounts with Companies House where they are made publicly available. Unlimited companies with a certain revenue must also file their accounts with Companies House.
3. Requirements to disclose sources of media revenue
There are no requirements in UK law beyond the registration of company accounts.
Any significant changes (starting with a 3% change in ownership) must be immediately reported to the Independent Television Commission.
C. Legislation concerning media ownership
Societal representatives are not appointed to the regulatory authorities (the Independent Television Commission or the Radio Authority). However, these bodies must carry out extensive research on and take into consideration audience opinion. The Broadcasting Complaints Commission and Broadcasting Standards Council are in place to further protect the pluralist interest.
National newspapers with less than 20% market share can own one private broadcaster (radio, television or satellite) and have full control of non-domestic satellite broadcasters. A publisher can also own up to three local radio licences if it has less than 20% of local circulation (subject to a public interest test). If a local newspaper has between 20 and 50% of local circulation it can own up to one local FM radio station and one AM station. If a local newspaper has over 50% of local circulation it can only own one local radio station (subject to a public interest test). Terrestrial broadcasters can own up to 20% stake in national newspapers and non-domestic satellite licences. Regional publishers are allowed to own one regional broadcaster, as long as there is no major overlap between the area licensed and the area in which the newspaper is circulated.
A new market measurement was introduced in the Act to limit audience share of broadcasters to 15% (for both television and radio stations). So a company can own more than one licence as long as the combination of ownership and licence holding does not exceed 15%. The measurement is based upon the percentage company ownership and their corresponding audience share (as worked out by the ITC and Radio Authority), not on channels (as in Germany). Although market concentrations have taken place, ITV channels continue to have complicated ownership structures created by past UK legislation. ITV is separated into regional divisions which are licensed to 18 companies. These ITV companies in turn are owned by other investors in a increasingly complicated arrangement of cross media-holdings.
Further no legal entity can control more than one ITV channel for the same area. Control of both an ITV licence and Channel five is not allowed. here is a restriction of ownership of one FM and one AM station licence in a same area. Three licences may be granted subject to a public interest test. No legal entity own more than one national radio station.
There are no restrictions on foreign ownership of the press.
Terrestrial broadcasting licenses are limited to those with EU residence. There are no foreign ownership restrictions for ownership of cable, satellite or digital terrestrial broadcasting licences.
D. Legislation ensuring access (e.g. distribution platform, interconnection, essential facilities)
Access and pricing is decided on a case by case basis by the OFTEL which is slowly introducing sector liberalization. The UK has not yet implemented the European ONP directive.
A concentration can be blocked if it totals over £30 million. Investigations are conducted by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT). Upon the advice of OFT, the Minister for Trade and Industry decides whether further investigations are needed. If so, these are carried out by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The MMC decides whether a dominant position would occur and recommends either a block or changes to the concentration. A final decision is taken in Parliament.
There are special provisions for press concentration under the 1973 Fair Trading Act. A transfer in ownership of a newspaper with more than 500,000 copies daily circulation must be approved by the Minister for Trade and Industry (referral by OFT is unneccessary). The Minister can also block a transfer of a newspaper with less than 50,000 daily circulation. In making a decision, the Minister must take into consideration the public interest (this is a so-called "public interest test"). In practice, such a decision of course could be arbitrary and possibly political motivated.
Under UK competition law, market concentration is limited to 25% of a relevant market.
Companies are limited to 15% of combined broadcasting audience share under the 1996 Broadcasting Act.
The Director General of Fair Trading can make further judgements regarding commercial terrestrial television interests according to a "competition test".
Newspapers are exempted from VAT.
Subsidies are provided for specialist Channel 4 programming, Gaelic language programming for Scottish ITV and the Welsh Channel (S4C).
Advertisers and their associates are not permitted to have ownership in a company holding a broadcasting licence. Neither permitted are individuals with a shareholding of over 5% in an advertiser.
There is no specific legislation on editorial or journalistic independence. A Freedom of Information Bill was introduced in the House of Lords in 1988. It received its second reading on 10 February 1999. The government's white paper can be read at:
http://www.official-documents.co.uk/document/caboff/foi/contents.htm.
The Broadcasting Acts require that broadcasters provide impartial and accurate news reporting. To such ends, the Independent Television Commission and the Radio Authority publish codes of conduct on impartiality. The BBC is also required to be impartial and accurate in news reporting according to its licence agreement.
The BBC and ITV companies are required to provide regional news and programming. The BBC, ITV and Channel Four have requirements relating to pluralist representation of societal groups.
The 1996 Broadcasting Act contains provisions to guarantee the availability of live coverage of listed events to television. The listed events are: FA Cup Final, Scottish FA Cup Final, FIFA World Cup Final, The Derby, Grand National, Olympic Games, Wimbledon Tennis Championships and Cricket Test Matches involving England.
The rules apply to domestic broadcasting (i.e. those under licence from the ITC) and for reception in the UK.
If an ownership limit is over-reached by a company, a broadcasting licence can be revoked by either the ITC or Radio Authoriy.
K. Future regulatory proposals and trends
A new broadcasting bill is anticipated from the UK Labour government which will allow competition between broadcasters and telecommunications operators.
IV. European law
Since the initiation of its single market programme (beginning with the Single European Act in 1985), the European Union has played a significant role in the regulation of European media markets. It has done so through statutory law of the European Union, competition law (through the Merger Task Force) and case decisions of the European Court of Justice. The European Commission has not yet ratified any statutory legislation relating specifically to ownership, but the Merger Task Force and the Court of Justice have dealt with the issue. This section shall give an overview of European media laws and institutional decisions relating to media ownership.
Statutory Law
There are four basic types of EC statutory law (as produced by the European Commission and ratified by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament): Directives, Recommendations, Resolutions and Decisions. A Regulation is a law which takes immediate effect at the national level and is implemented exactly as specified by the European Commission. Most EU media laws however come in the form of Directives. A Directive is similar to a Regulation, but the implementation of a Directive is left up to the Member States. Recommendations and Resolutions are merely policy suggestions and are not mandatory. Decisions are made in individual cases (with specific countries or companies).
Transfrontier Broadcasting
The most relevant European Directive regulating the media industry is the 1989 Television without Frontiers (TWF) . Television without Frontiers established a legal framework for the cross border transmission of television programmes thereby creating a single audio-visual market. The most important principle to TWF media company may only be regulated in the country of transmission, not reception. The Directive requires that a majority of a broadcasters' transmission time should be devoted to European content (made by European producers). This is excluding the time committed to news, sports events, games, advertising and teletext services. it must not be lower than the average. If European content did not constitute a majority of a country's programming in the year of 1988, a member state is not obligated to provide more than that level (the level established in 1988) of European programming. So the minimum levels reserved for European content differ from state to state. TWF uniformly requires broadcasters to reserve at least ten per cent of their programming (excluding the time appointed to news, sports events, games, advertising and teletext), or at least ten per cent of their programming budget for European independent production.
TWF contains restrictions on advertising. There may be an advertising break every 20 minutes during most programming. During films, there may be advertising only every 45 minutes. News programmes, current affairs, documentaries, religious programmes, and children's programmes of less than 30 minutes may not be interrupted by advertising. Advertising is limited to 15 % of total daily transmission time and to 20% within a one-hour period. Advertisement of cigarettes, tobacco and medicines available only on prescription are prohibited.
Under the TWF Directive, Member States are permitted to maintain national laws relating to the provision of information, education, culture and entertainment and to the protection of pluralism of information and pluralism of the media. These national laws however can only be meant for regulating domestic broadcasting and not for regulating broadcasts from abroad. TWF has fundamental rules governing the protection of minors and the right of reply.
The Television Without Frontiers Directive was updated in 1997. It better specifies the definition of "country of origin." For example a company is defined as being based in a country where the majority of its work-force sits, not where its editorial decisions originate from. It lays down rules for disputes. A broadcaster can also be regulated in a country if it uses a frequency of that country (in the case of satellite broadcasting, a company is only regulated by the country wherein the satellite company is based). The new Directive stipulates that Member States should draw up a list of broadcasting events which are deemed to be of "major importance to society" and guarantee their broadcast on free television (or how that state deems fit). The Directive also excepts the TWF European content rules from channels dedicated to teletext services or teleshopping. The Directive expands further on rules relating to the protection of minors and public order, and establishes a contact committee (to monitor and provide a platform for discussion of legislation).
Regarding the provision in Television Without Frontiers on establishing a list of special broadcasting events which are considered to be of "major importance to society": only Denmark has implemented this measure and reported it to the Commission. However Member States have made up previous lists. (These are stated in country reports in section IV of this study).
Universal Service
Two European Directives deal with universal service. The first, entitled the Full Competition Directive, sets out general requirements for interconnection and interconnection offerings by the incumbents. (Full Competition Directive, Commission Directive 96/19/EC, 13.3.1996, full competition in telecommunications markets, O.J. L 74, p. 13). The second, the ONP Interconnection Directive, gives a more specific implementation direction of the general requirements laid out in the first Directive. (Directive 97/ 33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10.4.1997 on interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through application of the principles of open network provision (ONP), O.J. L 199, 26.7.1997, p.32.) (The Full Competition Directive is based on Article 90 of the Treaty of Rome. The ONP Interconnection Directive is based on Article 100(a) of the SEA.
According to the 1997 Directive, the ONP framework provides harmonised rules for access and interconnection to the telecommunications networks and the voice telephony services. New entrants into telecommunications markets must be ensured the right to have access to the networks of incumbent telecommunications operators. Responsibility for regulation is tiered between authorities, at regional, national and EU levels. Most of the Directive deals with tariffs for new market entrants. The ONP Directive requires that tariffs should be non-discriminatory and balanced (a fund for universal service is to be set up by each government). The stipulated deadline for implementing the ONP Directive was December 1998. However, as with most EU Directives, this timetable has not been met. As of yet, only France and Italy have implemented the ONP Directive. France introduced a "universal service financing mechanism" to which new entrants are required to contribute. In Italy a fund was set up in 1999 based upon the results of telecommunications operators in 1998. Ireland and Belgian are also introducing fund this year. The European Commission however is unsatisfied with the way in which Member States are implementing the Directive. (Opt outs from Directives 96/19/EC and 96/2/EC have been made for Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Luxembourg).
EU Directives, Recommendations, Resolutions and Decisions in the field of media policy
Resolution of the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the Member
States, meeting within the Council of 25 January 1999 concerning public service
broadcasting.
Official Journal NO. C30, 05.02.1999 P. 1
Directive 98.84.EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the legal
protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access.
Official Journal NO. L 320, 28.11.1998 P.0054 - 0057
Council Recommendation of 24 September 1998 on the development of the competitiveness
of the European audiovisual and information services industry by promoting national
frameworks aimed at achieving a comparable and effective level of protection of minors and
human dignity.
Official journal NO. L 270, 07.10.1998 P.0048 - 0055
Council Conclusions of 17 February 1997 on the Green Paper on the protection of minors
and human dignity in the audiovisual and information services
Official journal NO. C 070 , 06.03.1997 P. 0004 - 0004
Directive 97.36.EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997
amending Council Directive 89.552.EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of
television broadcasting activities
Official journal NO. L 202 , 30.07.1997 P. 0060 - 0071
95.564.EC: Council Decision of 22 December 1995 on the implementation of a training
programme for professionals in the European audiovisual programme industry (Media II -
Training)
Official journal NO. L 321 , 30.12.1995 P. 0033 - 0038
95.563.EC: Council Decision of 10 July 1995 on the implementation of a programme
encouraging the development and distribution of European audiovisual works (Media II -
Development and distribution) (1996- 2000)
Official journal NO. L 321 , 30.12.1995 P. 0025 - 0032
Directive 95.47.EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on
the use of standards for the transmission of television signals
Official journal NO. L 281 , 23.11.1995 P. 0051 - 0054
Resolution of the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the Member
States, meeting within the Council of 5 October 1995 on the image of women and men
portrayed in advertising and the media
Official journal NO. C 296 , 10.11.1995 P. 0015 - 0016
ommission Directive 95.51.EC of 18 October 1995 amending Directive 90.388.EEC with
regard to the abolition of the restrictions on the use of cable television networks for
the provision of already liberalized telecommunications services
Official journal NO. L 256 , 26.10.1995 P. 0049 - 0054
Commission Directive 94.46.EC of 13 October 1994 amending Directive 88.301.EEC and
Directive 90.388.EEC in particular with regard to satellite communications
Official Journal L 268 , 19.10.1994 p. 0015 - 0021
Council Resolution of 27 June 1994 on a framework for Community policy on digital video
broadcasting
Official journal NO. C 181 , 02.07.1994 P. 0003 - 0004
Council Resolution of 5 November 1993 on the first century of the cinema
Official journal NO. C 085 , 22.03.1994 P. 0003 - 0003
Council Directive 93.83.EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules
concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting
and cable retransmission
Official journal NO. L 248 , 06.10.1993 P. 0015 - 0021
Council Resolution of 22 July 1993 on the development of technology and standards in
the field of advanced television services
Official journal NO. C 209 , 03.08.1993 P. 0001 - 0002
Council Decision of 22 July 1993 on an action plan for the introduction of advanced television services in Europe
Council Directive 92.38.EEC of 11 May 1992 on the adoption of standards for satellite broadcasting of television signals
Council Resolution of 28 June 1990 on the strengthening of the Europe-wide cooperation
on radio frequencies, in particular with regard to services with a pan-European dimension
Official journal NO. C 166 , 07.07.1990 P. 0004 - 0006
Council Directive 89.552.EEC of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States
concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities
Official journal NO. L 298 , 17.10.1989 P. 0023 - 0030
89.337.EEC: Council Decision of 27 April 1989 on high-definition television
Official journal NO. L 142 , 25.05.1989 P. 0001 - 0002
89.630.EEC: Council Decision of 7 December 1989 on the common action to be taken by the
Member Stateswith respect to the adoption of a single world-wide high- definition
television production standard by the Plenary Assembly of the International Radio
Consultative Committee (CCIR) in 1990
Official journal NO. L 363 , 13.12.1989 P. 0030 - 0030
Resolution of the Council and of the Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs,
meeting within the Council of 13 November 1986 on the European cinema and television year
(1988)
Official journal NO. C 320 , 13.12.1986 P. 0004 - 0004
Council Directive 86.529.EEC of 3 November 1986 on the adoption of common technical specifications of the MAC.packet family of standards for direct satellite television broadcasting
Second Council Directive 65.264.EEC of 13 May 1965 implementing in respect of the film
industry the provisions of the General Programmes for the abolition of restrictions on
freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services
Official journal NO. 085 , 19.05.1965 P. 1437 - 1439
Council Directive 63.607.EEC of 15 October 1963 implementing in respect of the film industry the provisions of the General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on freedom to provide services
94.800.EC: Council Decision (of 22 December 1994) concerning the conclusion on behalf
of the European Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements
reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations (1986-1994)
Official journal NO. L 336 , 23.12.1994 P. 0001 - 0002
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986- 1994) - Annex 1 - Annex 1C -
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (later confirmed at the
World Trade Organization)
Official journal NO. L 336 , 23.12.1994 P. 0214 - 0233.
Communications, Green Papers, and, Working Papers
Commission Communication: Results of the Public Consultation on the Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors COM(1999)108 final, 09.03.1999
http://www.ispo.cec.be.convergencegp.htm
Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy. COM (1998) 596 final, 09.12.1998
http://www.ispo.cec.be.infosoc.telecompolicy.en.comm-en.htm
"The Digital Age: European Audiovisual Policy." Report from the High Level Group
on Audiovisual Policy, chaired by Commissioner Marcelino Oreja. 26.10.1998.
Summary of the results of the public consultation on the Green Paper on the convergence of the telecommunications, media and information technology sectors; areas for further reflection. Working document of the Commission. SEC (1998) 1284 final, 29.07.1998.
http://www.ispo.cec.be.convergencegp.htm
Draft Council Decision (EC) establishing a Community statistical information infrastructure relating to the industry and markets of audiovisual and related sectors and Draft action plan establishing an information infrastructure relating to the industry and markets of the audiovisual and related sectors. SEC (1998) 1325 final, 27.07.1998.
"Audiovisual Policy: Next Steps." Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. COM (1998) 446 final, 14.07.1998.
Final annual report on progress in implementing the action plan for the introduction of advanced television services in Europe. COM (1998) 441 final, 13.07.1998
http://www.ispo.cec.be.infosoc.telecompolicy.en.com441en.html
Third Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the application of Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 89.552.EEC "Television without Frontiers" for the period 1995-96, including an overall assessment of application over the period 1991-96. COM (98) 199 final, 03.04.1998.
Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the Harmonization of
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the Information Society. COM
(1997) 628 final, 10.12.1997.
Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors,and the Implications for Regulation. Towards an Information Society Approach. COM (97) 623 final, 03.12.1997
(http://www.ispo.cec.be.convergencegp)
Communication on the follow-up to the Green Paper on the Protection of Minors and Human Dignity in Audiovisual and Information Services, Proposal for a Recommendation. COM (97) 570 final, 18.11.1997
Second Report on the Application of Directive 89.552.EEC "Television without Frontiers". COM (97) 523 final, 24.10.1997
Protocol on the system of public broadcasting (Treaty of Amsterdam), 02.10.1997
Amendment to the "Television without Frontiers" Directive (97.36.EC).
30.06.1997
Green Paper on the Protection of Minors and Human Dignity in Audiovisual and Information Services. COM (96) 483 final, 16.10.1996.
Green Paper on New Audio-Visual Services (currently being written by DG X).
COM (94) 353 final, 05.10.1994., Follow Up to the Consultation Process Relating to the Green Paper on ‘Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market- an Assessment of the Need for Community Action’
Green Paper on Commercial Communications in the Single Market 08.05.96
Legal Protection for Encrypted Services in the Internal Market. Consultation on the Need for Community Action. Commission Green Paper 06.03.96
COMM (92) 480 ‘Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market’ 23.12.92
EU Competition Law
Under EU competition policy, the European Commission has direct authority to make decisions which are not subject to approval by the Council of Ministers or the European Parliament, only to review by the European Court of Justice. As such, competition policy is a key policy area of the European Commission. Within the Commission, Directorate General IV (DG IV) has responsibility for competition decisions and houses the Merger Task Force. Competition law has been utilised in a number of decisions concerning media concentration. Since the 1989 Merger Regulation, the Merger Task Force has made 1074 merger decisions. Only 11 of these have been negative, 9 of which have dealt with the media industry.
The European Commission's Merger Task Force firstly applies competition law to the broadcasting industry according to articles 85, 86, and 90 as defined under the Treaty of Rome. This occurs when agreements between companies are seen to come into conflict with the creation of a single market or there is generally a perceived threat to competition through cartels, monopolies or mergers. Article 85 prohibits private sector anti-competitive agreements and Article 86 prevents the abuse of dominant position. Articles 85 and 86 are applied to the public sector by Article 90. The main concern when applying these articles is that markets remain open and identifiable entry barriers are removed.
Previous to 1990, all Commission competition decisions were made under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. From 1990 onwards, merger decisions were made under the 1989 Merger Regulation, although joint venture decisions continued to be made under Articles 85 and 86. The Merger Regulation required proposed mergers with global sales revenues totaling over five billion ECU to notify the Merger Task Force for permission. Notification allowed companies to receive a quick decision from the Commission (within one month). In April 1997, the Merger Regulation was amended to include joint venture decisions and thresholds were lowered from five to two and a half billion ECU.
Under the Merger Regulation, the Merger Task Force accommodates the special status of the media industry within existing EU competition law. Member States are permitted under Article 21 of the Merger Regulation, which stipulates that national authorities may protect legitimate interests, to prohibit a concentration which has been cleared by the European Commission, if this is in the interest of media pluralism at their domestic level. The Merger Task Force regards these pluralism cases as originating either when separately defined markets are involved in multi-media transactions or when media mergers, which are not viewed as a threat to competition, are perceived as a danger to pluralism.
In February 1990, the Merger Task Force clarified its position towards the audio-visual industry in its Communication to the Council and European Parliament on Audiovisual Policy. The Communication identifies the audio-visual sector's “specific economic and cultural considerations” which reverberate the structural weakness of the audio-visual sector and to the high level of intra-sector co-operation. It is stated that EU competition rules would continue to apply equally to the audio-visual sector as they do to other sectors, but a list of factors relevant to the audio-visual sector were given which would be taken into consideration when media competition decisions were made.
Following the 1989 Television Without Frontiers directive and the 1989 Merger Regulation, there was a dramatic increase in both Europe-wide media mergers and Merger Task Force media decisions (see table 2 below). The majority of Merger Task Force merger decisions were decided positively in favour of market concentration. For the purposes of this study only decisions of significance following the 2989 Merger Regulation are discussed.
The first media concentration case of significance was the ABC/Generale des Eaux/Canal+/WH Smith decision of 1991. Although the Merger Task Force determined a dominant position, the joint venture between the companies was allowed to go ahead. The case is interesting because it dealt with sports broadcasting which was deemed by the Merger Task Force to be “particularly amenable for transnational broadcasting as (it) transcend(s) national, cultural and linguistic barriers.” This view is significant for future Commission policy. The Merger Task Force considers sports broadcasting as no longer to be restricted to a national (geographical) market.
In its first negative media decision, the 1991 Screensport/EBU decision, the Merger Task Force refused to grant a joint venture between Sky Television, News International and the EBU. The venture would have granted a private broadcaster (BSkyB) access to exclusive rights obtained by a consortium of public broadcasters (EBU)..
A further case of interest that occurred in 1993 was the BBC/BskyB/Football Association decision. BSkyB and the BBC shared rights to broadcast English FA matches. The Commission did not rule against the agreement but stressed that such exclusive rights agreements should normally be limited to one sport season. A longer period was only deemed justifiable by the Merger Task Force because BSkyB was entering a new market for direct satellite television.
The 1994 Telepiu decision, Kirch and Richemont sought the purchase of the Italian television group Telepiu. The Commission could not justify a negative decision as Italy presented a new national market for the companies involved. However, it was established through this decision that pay television constituted a separate product market.
In its 1994 MSG Media Service decision, the Merger Task Force ruled against a German joint venture for pay television called Media Service GmbH (MSG) between Bertelsmann, Kirch and Deutsche Telekom (DT). The Commission considered in this case the separate markets of technical and administrative services for pay-TV (the market in which MSG would have been directly present), cable distribution (DT), and pay-TV (Kirch and Bertlesmann through their shares in Premiere). It determined that MSG would have been dominant in all three of these markets and likely to gain a lasting dominant position in media markets (of the future), particularly for digital television where it would foreclose the market to new entrants.
The next case to be decided negatively was the Nordic Satellite Distribution (NSD) case in 1995. This related to the capacity of a satellite television responder. The Merger Task Force found that NSD (a joint venture between Norsk Telecomm, Tele Denmark and Kinnevik) would have acquired a dominant position in the markets for satellite television transponder services, pay television distribution, direct to home television, and cable television in Norway. The agreement would in turn have strengthened Tele Denmark’s dominant position in the Danish cable television market. The vertical integration of NSD meant that the companies’ respective positions in their national markets would have reinforced each other. The Merger Task Force expressed in this case that it wished to ensure that the Scandinavian markets, which were in a stage of liberalization, were not foreclosed to third parties.
In 1995, the Merger Task Force ruled against the Holland Media Group merger when RTL, Veronica and Endemol proposed a joint venture in commercial television in the Netherlands. The Dutch government had requested a ruling on the case under Article 22 of the Merger Regulation. Had the Dutch government not referred the case, the Merger Task Force would have had no jurisdiction to judge it as the turnover thresholds were below those required by the Merger Regulation. The Merger Task Force ruled the agreement would have led to the creation of a dominant position in the Dutch advertising and television markets and strengthen Endemol’s dominant position in the market for independent Dutch-language television production.
Later in July 1996, the Commission approved the joint venture following the withdrawal of Endemol from the project. Endemol is presently challenging the Merger Task Force over the original (1995) ruling at the Court of First Instance.
The following case to be considered in 1996 concerned the Spanish Cablevisión case. On 26 July 1995, Telefónica de España SA and its subsidiary Telecartera SA signed an agreement with Sociedad de Gestión de Cable SA (Sogecable) and Sociedad de Televisión Canal Plus SA (Canal Plus España) to acquire joint control of Sociedad General de Cablevisión SA (Cablevisión), in order to develop separate digital television projects. The Merger Task Force requested that Cablevisión be registered with the Commission in a letter to the Spanish competition authority on February 7, 1996 and (informally) recommended a negative decision on February 8. The Spanish government however refused to notify the case to the Commission (on grounds that the venture did not have a Community dimension). The Spanish competition authority authorized the concentration on March 1 (two days before the Spanish national election), sending a copy of their decision to the Merger Task Force which arrived later on March 11. On March 29, the Commission threatened with penalty payments under the Merger Regulation. Sogecable consequently referred the case to the Merger Task Force on May 31. Meanwhile, Sogecable contested the Commission's request for referral in the Court of First Instance (in which the the Merger Task Force request was upheld). In any case, in July 1996, the joint venture was halted by the new Spanish government (the Popular party) by postponing it for two-years in order to encourage the development of market competition. The Commission decided the case negatively ruling dominant position and foreclosure of the new cable market. However, before a decision was officially taken by the Commission, the joint venture was abandoned.
In 1997, there were a number of decisions made on joint ventures particularly within the German language media market, which shows an increasingly high degree of media concentration. In 1997 alone, the Merger Task Force examined joint ventures between Bertelsmann and Burda, Bertelsmann, Burda and Springer, Bertelsmann and Kirch (Premiere) and Deutsche Telekom/Betaresearch. Both the Premiere and Deutsche Telekom/Betaresearch joint ventures were blocked. The Commission ruled that the proposed joint venture would have given Premiere a monopoly both in programming and marketing; BetaDigital would have achieved a dominant position for technical services for pay television by satellite; and Deutsche Telekom would have achieved a dominant position for its cable network.
With the amendment of the Merger Regulation in April 1997, paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 85 have been extended to joint concentrative ventures to determine whether or not a dominant position is created or maintained. Even though turnover thresholds have been lowered from five to two and one half billion ECU under the new rules, only a small number of media decisions will use the new lowered thresholds due to the organisational requirements involved. The new rules entered into effect on March 1, 1998.
Media concentration decisions made by DG IV between 1989-1998
Decision |
Year |
Reference |
Ruling |
ARD.Metro Goldwyn Meyer Case No. IV.31.731 |
1989 |
[OJL 284.36, 03.10.89] |
Positive, with access to third parties |
UIP Decision Case No. IV.30.566 |
1989 |
[OJL 226.25, 12.07.89] |
Positive |
Screensport.EBU Case No. IV.32.524 |
1991 |
[OJL 063.32, 09.03.91] |
Negative |
ABC.Generale des Eaux.Canal+.WH Smith Case No. IV.M.110 |
1991 |
[OJ C 244.06, 10.09.91] |
Positive |
Ericsson.Kolbe Case No. IV.M.133 |
1992 |
[OJC 27.08, 22.01.1992] |
Positive |
Sunrise Decision Case No. IV.M.176 |
1992 |
[OJC 18.07, 24.01.94] |
Positive |
BBC.BskyB.Football Association Case No. IV.33.145 and IV.33.245 |
1993 |
[OJC 94.6, 03.04.93] |
Positive |
Tiercé Ladbroke SA Case No. IV.33 |
1993 |
[OJC 699, 24.06.93] |
Negative (upheld by ECJ) |
EBU.Eurovision Decision Case No. IV.32.150 |
1993 |
[OJL 179.06, 22.07.93] |
Positive (overturned by ECJ) |
Newspaper Publishing Case No. IV.M.423 |
1994 |
[OJC 85.05, 22.03.94] |
Positive |
BS.BT Case No. IV.M.425 |
1994 |
[OJC 134.03, 17.05.94] |
Positive |
British Telecom.MCI Case IV.M.353 |
1993 |
[OJC 259.03, 27.08.93] |
Negative |
Kirch.Richemont.Telepiu Decision Case No. IV.M.410 |
1994 |
[OJC 225.04, 13.08.94] |
Positive |
Bertelsmann.News International.Vox Decision Case No. IV.M.489 |
1994 |
[OJ C 274.06, 01.10.94] |
Positive |
MSG Media Service Case No. IV.M.469 |
1994 |
[OJL 364, 09.11.94] |
Negative |
Vox (II) Case No. IV.M.525 |
1994 |
[OJ C 57.06, 07.03.95] |
Positive |
Securicor.Datatrak Case No. IV.M.561 |
1995 |
[OJC 82.05, 20.03.95] |
Positive |
Omnitel Case No. IV.M.538 |
1995 |
[OJC 96.06, 20.04.95] |
Positive |
Blockbuster.Burda Case No. IV.M.579 |
1995 |
[OJC 129.06, 25.05.95] |
Positive |
CLT.Disney.Super RTL Case No. IV.M.566 |
1995 |
[OJC 144.05, 10.06.95] |
Positive |
Kirch . Richemont . Multichoice . Telepiu Case No. IV.M.584 |
1995 |
[OJC 129.07, 16.06.95] |
Positive |
Seagram.MCA Case No. 4064.89 |
1995 |
[OJC 149.06, 16.06.95] |
Positive |
Nordic Satellite Distribution Case No. IV.M.490 |
1995 |
[OJL 53, 19.07.95] |
Negative |
Cable&Wireless.Vebacom Case No.IV.M.618 |
1995 |
[OJC 231.03, 16.08.95] |
Positive |
RTL.Veronica.Endemol Case No. IV.M.553 |
1995 |
[OJL 294, 19.11.96 |
Negative |
Albacom (BT.BNL) Case No IV.M.604 |
1995 |
[OJC 278.05, 24.10.95] |
Positive |
Unisource. Telefónica Case No. IV.M.544 |
1996 |
[OJC 13.04, 06.11.96] |
Positive |
Canal.UFA.MDO Case No IV.M.655 |
1995 |
[OJC 15.05, 20.01.95] |
Positive |
British Telecomm.VIAG Case No. IV.M.595 |
1996 |
[OJC 15.04, 20.01.96] |
Positive |
Channel Five Case No. IV.M.673 |
1995 |
[OJC 57.04, 27.02.96] |
Positive |
Telefónica.Canal Plus.Cablevisión Case No. IV.M.0709 |
1996 |
[OJC 228.05, 07.08.96] |
Negative |
Viacom.Bear Stearns Case No. IV.M.717 |
1996 |
[OJC132.04, 04.05.96] |
Positive |
RTL.Veronica Case No. IV.M.553 |
1996 |
[OJL 649, 17.07.96] |
Positive |
N-TV Case No IV.M.810 |
1996 |
[OJC 366.05, 05.12.96] |
Positive |
Bertelsmann.CLT (Ufa) Case No IV.M.0779 |
1996 |
[OJC 364.05, 04.12.96] |
Positive |
ESPN.Star Case No. IV.M.826 |
1996 |
[OJC 386.06, 11.11.96] |
Positive |
DBKOM Case No IV.M 827 |
1997 |
[OJC 168.05, 03.06.97] |
Positive |
CEREOL. SAT - LM HLE Case No IV.M.866 |
1997 |
[OJC 146.05, 14.05.97] |
Positive |
British Telecom.MCI (II) Case No IV.M.856 |
1997 |
[14.05.97] |
Positive, but merger never went ahead |
Bertelsmann.Burda.Springer Hos MM Case No IV.M.972 |
1997 |
[15.09.97] |
Positive |
Bertelsmann.Burda Hos Lifeline Case No IV.M.973 |
1997 |
[15.09.97] |
Positive |
Albacomm.BT.ENI.Mediaset |
1997 |
[06.12.97] |
Positive |
Deutsche Telekom.Betaresearch Case No. IV.M.1027 |
1998 |
[27.95.98] |
Negative |
DF1.Premiere Case No. IV.M.993 |
1998 |
[01.06.98] |
Negative |
Wolters Kluwer.Reed Elsevier Case No. IV.M.230 |
1997 |
[12.12.97] |
Case dropped 11.03.98 |
Bertelsmann.Burda.Futurekids Case No . IV.M. 1072 |
1998 |
[29.01.98] |
Positive |
Cableeuropa.Spainco.CTC Case No. IV.M. 1091 |
1998 |
[28.01.98] |
Positive |
Cable I Televisio de Catalunya (CTC) Case No . IV.M.1022 |
1998 |
[28.01.98] |
Positive |
CLT-UFA.Havas Intermédiation Case No. IV.M.999 |
1998 |
[20.03.98] |
Positive |
Havas.Bertelsmann.Doyma Case No. IV.M.800 |
1998 |
[27.08.98] |
Positive |
Source: compiled by Alison Harcourt based on a review of DGIV Annual Reports and Press Releases
European Court of Justice
According to the Treaty of Rome, the task of the ECJ is "to ensure that the interpretation and application of the treaty is observed". The ECJ fulfills this task by reviewing the legality of acts passed by the EU institutions, monitoring compliance of Member States with the treaties and secondary legislation, and interpreting EU law for national courts. The ECJ has taken many decisions relating to the media industry.
The first significant ECJ case dealing with the media industry is the Sacchi case. In 1974, a tribunal court of the small Italian town, Biella, asked the ECJ for interpretation of articles 2, 3, 5, 7, 37, 86 and 90 of the treaty of Rome. Essentially it wanted to know whether the movement of goods within the common market applied to television signals. The ECJ ruled that “in the absence of express provision to the contrary in the treaty, a television signal must, by reason of its nature, be regarded a provision of services”. It added that “trade in material, sound recordings, films, apparatus and other products used for the diffusion of television signals are subject to the rules relating to freedom of movement for goods”.
A second case of much importance was the Debauve case of 1980 which established that any discrimination by a member state against a broadcasting signal due to national origin is illegal. The judgement restates the Sacchi ruling that broadcasting should be considered as a service. It declares however that the broadcasters continue to be governed by the broadcasting regulations stipulated by the country of reception. The ruling related to three cable broadcasters of foreign origin which were transmitting advertising to cable subscribers in Belgium. Belgium legislation at the time banned the transmission of commercial advertising.
A case dealing with the problem of the cross-border transmission and the ownership of exclusive media rights first appeared before the ECJ in 1980 with the initial Coditel case. In this case, an exclusive licence for showing the film “La Boucher” was granted to Cinévog, a Belgian company, for use in Belgium and Luxembourg. The film could be shown on television only after 40 months of its cinema release. Across the border, the German cable company Coditel had bought rights to broadcast the film from a German company holding exclusive rights which could show the film in Germany after only 12 months of general release. As Coditel showed the film to its subscribers in Belgium and Luxembourg it was ruled to be infringing upon Cinévog’s copyright. Cinévog’s copyright was upheld in this case, but the Court stated that each exclusive rights case must be examined in the context of the relevant market in order that the case of a dominant position may not occur.
The first of the Magill cases handled the appeal for annulment of a decision made by DG IV brought by ITP (Independent Television Publications of ITV). The original case had dealt with BBC, ITP and RTE in Ireland and Northern Ireland, which owned exclusive rights to publish their programming schedules, and Magill TV Guide Limited, which wished to publish a programming guide. Magill had started publishing the guide including all programming schedules in 1985 but was stopped by an Irish court injunction in 1986 (brought about by the BBC, ITP and RTE). The decision was overturned by an Irish high court. The cases were taken to DG IV which determined in separate rulings that the exclusive licences infringed article 86 of the treaty determining dominant market position. An annulment of the Commission decision was sought by the BBC, ITP and RTE at the European Court of First Instance (CFI). The CFI in three separate rulings decided against the BBC, ITP and RTE in support of the DGIV decisions. It stated that ITV had used “the copyright in its weekly programme listings under national law to reserve the exclusive right to publish those listings, thus preventing the emergence on the ancillary market of television magazines, where it enjoys a monopoly, of a new product containing the programmes of all the broadcasting stations capable of being received by television viewers, for which there is potential consumer demand”. RTE and ITP appealed to the ECJ which in a single final ruling in 1994 upheld the three Court of First Instance Magill decisions.
The Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands case of 1991 was of much importance. When the first case was brought to the ECJ in 1989, under Dutch media law, even foreign companies which obtained air time on the national broadcasting network were obliged to carry Dutch public service programmes on a certain number of their radio stations and, for a percentage of time, on their television stations. The Court ruled against the Netherlands, claiming that:
Even if such a restriction forms part of a cultural policy intended to safeguard the freedom of expression of the various social, cultural, religious and philosophical components of society by ensuring the survival of an undertaking which provides them with technical resources, it goes beyond the objective pursued, since pluralism in the audio-visual sector of a Member State cannot be affected in any way by allowing the national bodies operating in that sector to make use of providers of services established in other Member States.
The Greek Elliniki Radiophonia Tilorassi - Anonimi Etairia v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas case was concerned with a Greek media ownership Law of No 1730/1987 which banned commercial broadcasters and in the Court’s view, established a “public television monopoly”. In 1988, the Mayor of Thessaloniki illegally set up a television station and began to broadcast. A Greek court injunction was issued restraining broadcast transmission and ordering seizure and sequestration of the technical equipment. The case was taken to a national court, which referred the case to the ECJ. The ECJ ruled that it could interfere with Greek law governing a public monopoly in domestic broadcasting, as the public broadcaster monopolises not only transmission but also exclusive rights. In this respect, the Court ruled that the establishment a public broadcasting monopoly “must be regarded as an ostensibly illegal measure by virtue of the combined provisions of Articles 90 and 86, which cannot be justified by virtue of Article 90(2)”. By this period in time, perhaps in participation of the ECJ ruling, the Greek government had passed a new media ownership Law No 1866/1989 allowing for local commercial television stations (approved by ministerial decision).
This determination on behalf of the Court to intervene in member state media law continued in 1992, when the ECJ ruled against the Belgian state in European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium. It decided that Belgium had failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 52, 59, 60 and 221 of the EEC Treaty on four accounts: by prohibiting cable programmes from other Member States where the programme was not in the language stipulated by Belgian law; by subjecting cable commercial broadcasters from other Member States to prior authorisation, to which conditions might have been attached; by reserving 51% of the capital of the Flemish commercial broadcaster for publishers of Dutch-language daily and weekly newspapers; and by compelling commercial broadcasters to constitute a compulsory part of their programming to cultural interest.
TV10 SA v. Commissariaat voor de Media dealt with the Luxembourg based company, TV10, which was commercially broadcasting to the Netherlands. According to Dutch media ownership law, as in Greece, commercial broadcasters were not permitted. The Dutch regulatory body for broadcasting, the Commissariaat voor de Media, took TV10 to a Dutch court, which referred the case to the ECJ. The ECJ upheld the Sacchi decision that broadcasting be considered a service and restated the Debauve decision that foreign broadcasts must be permitted. The Court therefore ruled that the commercial broadcasters were in their right to broadcast to the Netherlands from abroad. The ECJ found that foreign broadcasters were subject to broadcasting rules laid down in the member state of reception (later implementation of TWF stipulated broadcasters be regulated by the state of origin). The ECJ, stated in its ruling:
The Treaty provisions on freedom to provide services cannot therefore be interpreted as precluding a Member State from treating as a domestic broadcaster a broadcasting body constituted under the law of another Member State and established in that State but whose activities are wholly or principally directed towards the territory of the first Member State, if that broadcasting body was established there in order to avoid the rules adopted by the first Member State as part of a cultural policy intended to establish a pluralist and non-commercial radio and television broadcasting system.
Two years later, in another case concerning national media ownership legislation, the Court decided in favour of the TWF rules in its TV10 decision. In 1996, the ECJ ruled that the UK had failed to adequately implement the Television Without Frontiers (TWF) directive in the Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland case. Following an examination of the provisions of the UK Broadcasting Act 1990, the Commission informed the UK that it had failed to correctly transpose several articles of the TWF directive into national law. After a series of letters sent between the Commission and the UK, the Commission took the UK to the ECJ 28 July 1994. The Commission challenged the UK on two accounts. Firstly, it objected to the criteria set out in section 43 the 1990 Broadcasting Act which applied a different regime to non-domestic satellite services as that applicable to domestic satellite services. Secondly, and most importantly, it claimed that the UK had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 2(1) and (2) and Article 3(2) of TWF by exercising control over broadcasts transmitted by a broadcaster that falls under the jurisdiction of another Member State. The Court ruled in favour of DG IV and suggested a rewording of the 1990 Broadcasting Act, by which time the 1996 Broadcasting Act was almost in place.
The judgement by the Court of First instance in the 1996 Eurovision case is important for two reasons. Firstly because it considers the status of public service broadcasters and secondly because it is the only case in which the CFI annuls a DG IV media decision. The decision concerned programming rights acquired by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) which were for exclusive use of its members. DG IV had exempted the EBU from EU competition rules Article 85 (3) to enable it to share exclusive rights in view of the EBU members’ public service role. Although the commercial broadcasters Canal Plus and TF1 had been granted membership by the EBU in 1984 and in 1986 (while they were still public but soon to be privatised), La Cinq, M6 and Antena 3 were later refused membership. La Cinq, M6, Antena, RTI and Telecinco took the DG IV decision to the CFI. In two cases (one jointly decided), the CFI ruled in favour of allowing the commercial stations access to Eurovision and against DG IV which means that the Court does not regard public service broadcasters differently to commercial broadcasters under EU competition law. Whether this decision shall be challenged with the new public service broadcasting protocol within the Amsterdam treaty has yet to be seen. The case is now under appeal.
A case concerning media ownership and national law emerged in 1997 with VT4 Ltd v Vlaamse Gemeenschap. According to Belgium media ownership law, the Flemish Executive can license only one commercial television broadcaster at a time. In 1987 this licence was granted to Vlaamse Televisie Maatschappij NV (`VTM') to broacast its station VT4 for a term of 18 years. Under the same provisions, only one broadcaster (radio or television) for the Flemish Community may be licensed to transmit advertising. This licence was also issued to VT4 for a term of 18 years in 1987. In Flanders, VTM therefore holds a legal monopoly in commercial television and television advertising. With the 18 year licence intact, VTM was bought by Scandinavian Broadcasting SA (registered in Luxembourg) and VT4’s broadcasting headquarters relocated to London. VT4 secured a non-domestic satellite service licence from the UK permitting it to broadcast to Flanders. VTM has a branch at Nossegem, in Flanders where it both maintains contact with advertising firms which broadcast on VT4 and collects material for Flemish news programmes. On 16 January 1995 the Flemish Minister of Culture and Brussels Affairs prohibited the retransmission of VT4 programming by cable network operators in Flanders. This decision by the Flemish minister was overturned by the ECJ, which found it to be in conflict with TWF.
A similar case was ruled on the same day against Belgium, again upholding TWF. The UK had this time issued a non-domestic satellite service licence for UK Turner Entertainment Network International Limited (subsidiary of the US American Turner Group) which owns The Cartoon Network Limited and Turner Network Television Limited which broadcast programmes via satellite through the Astra satellite. On September 17, 1993 Turner International Network Sales Limited concluded an agreement with Coditel Brabant SA (hereinafter `Coditel'), the Belgian cable television company to distribute Turner programming to Brussels. As there was no legislation at that time governing cable television in Brussels, a Royal Decree was issued the day before the agreement (on September 16, 1993) designed to stop the cable company from taking advantage of the lack of legislation. Coditel was prohibitied from distributing the television programmes `TNT' and `Cartoon Network'. Turner International Network Sales Limited took the case to the Tribunal de Commerce in Brussels for an interim order allowing Coditel to carry out its contract. The order was granted by the tribunal on October 26, 1993 and Coditel began broadcasting. In June 1994 the Belgian State brought third-party proceedings against the interim order of October 26, 1993. In November 1994, the Tribunal de Commerce referred the case to the ECJ and prevented Coditel from broadcasting until a decision had been made. This decision was reversed at in April 1995 by the Belgian Cour d'Appel, which withdrew the case from the ECJ. Meanwhile, the Belgian state began separate criminal proceedings against Paul Denuit, the managing director of Coditel, for ignoring the Ministerial Decree of 17 September 1993. The Tribunal de Première Instance sent this case to the ECJ which ruled in favour of Denuit in 1997 and upheld TWF.
The issue of exclusive media rights appeared in 1997 with the Tiercé Ladbroke SA v Commission of the European Communities case. Tiercé Ladbroke SA asked the Court for an annulment of the DG IV Decision of June 24, 1993 rejecting a complaint lodged by Tiercé Ladbroke SA against Pari Mutuel Urbain and Pari Mutuel (PMU) International (PMI), the principal French sociétes de courses (horse-racing associations). PMI had granted Deutscher Sportverlag Kurt Stoof GmbH & Co. (`DSV') exclusive rights to French horse-racing broadcasts in Germany and Austria. In September 1989, Ladbroke asked DSV to grant it the right to retransmit the broadcasts in Belgium. DSV refused in October 1989 on the ground that its contract with PMI prevented it from retransmitting the French sound and pictures outside the licensed territory. However, PMI runs a service called `Courses en direct’ that enables horse races run in France to be viewed live by satellite. PMI was prepared to licence this service to Pari Mutuel Unifié Belge, Tiercé Franco-Belge and the Dumoulin company, but not to Ladbroke. Ladbroke asserted this direct refusal to provide Ladbroke with the French broadcasts constituted an abuse of a joint dominant position for which there was no objective justification. Despite the ruling reached in Magill, the Court refused to rule in favour of Ladbroke and supported the DG IV decision.
Despite the substantial development of case law in the broadcasting sector, the ECJ has been less active in the press sector. In one of the few cases concerning the press market in 1981, the ECJ decided to maintain a hands-off approach to national legislation. This case, Maria Salonia v Giorgio Poidomani and Franca Baglieri, née Giglio, concerned the ‘National Agreement’ between the Federazione Italiana Editori Giornali (Italian Federation of Newspaper Publishers) and the Federazione Sindacale Unitaria Giornalai) the United Federation of Trade Unions of Newsagents made on October 23, 1974. The legality of the exclusive distribution agreement for national newspapers and periodicals was assessed in terms of its compatibility with the articles of the Treaty of Rome. The agreement was looked at only to determine whether it would effect the market for publications from other Member States. The Court ruled that there was no conflict with the Treaty. This hands-off approach was maintained in the recent Familiapress v. Bauer case in 1997.
Media decisions made by the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance 1974-1998
| Case Number | Companies | Year | Reference | Subject of case |
| Case 155.73 | Tribunale civile e penale di Biella |
1974 | [30.04.74, ECR 0409 – 0433] | television signals be considered a service under the treaty |
| Case 52.79 | Procureur du Roi v Marc J.V.C. Debauve and others | 1980 | [18.03.80, ECR 0833] | the discrimination of broadcasting signals due to national origin |
| Case 262.81 | Coditel SA, Compagnie Generale pour la Diffusion de la Television and others v Cine-Vog Films SA and others | 1981 | [10.06.82, ECR 3381-3403] | cross-border transmission and the ownership of exclusive rights programming |
| Case 126.80 | Maria Salonia v Giorgio Poidomani and Franca Baglieri, née Giglio | 1981 | [16.96.81, ECR 1584] | newspaper distribution |
| Case 262.81 | Coditel SA. and others vs. Cinè Vog. And others, (Coditel II) | 1982 | [6.10.1982, ECR 3381-3403] | abuse of dominant position |
| Case 298.83 | Comité des industries cinématographiques des
Communautés européennes (CICCE) v Commission of the European Communities |
1985 | [16.01.85, ECR 1106 - 1116] | abuse of dominant position in broadcasting films on television |
| Case 311.84 | Telemarketing vs. CLT | 1985 | [3.10.1985, ECR 3261-3279] | abuse of dominant position |
| Case 163.84 | Hauptzollamt Hannover v Telefunken Fernseh und Rundfunk GmbH | 1985 | [10.07.85, ECR 3299-3319] | abuse of dominant position in broadcasting |
| Case 352.85 | Bond van Adverteerders and others v The Netherlands State | 1988 | [14.01.88 ECR 2085] | prohibition of advertising and subtitling in television programmes transmitted from abroad |
| Case 77.89 R | Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission of the European Communities | 1991 | [10.07.91, II-0485] | abuse of dominant position |
| Case T-70.89 | The British Broadcasting Corporation and BBC Enterprises Limited v Commission of the European Communities | 1991 | [10.07.91, ECR II-0535] | abuse of dominant position |
| Case T-76.89 | Independent Television Publications Ltd v Commission of the European Communities | 1991 | [10.07.1991, ECR II-0575] | abuse of dominant position |
| Case C-353.89. | Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands | 1991 | [25.07.91, ECR I-4069] | challenge to Dutch obligation to use the services of a national undertaking for the production of radio and television programmes |
| Case C-260.89 | Elliniki Radiophonia Tilorassi - Anonimi Etairia v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas | 1991 | [31.07.91, ECR 2925] | exclusive rights in the matter of radio and television |
| Case C-288.89 | Stichting Collectiev Antennevoorziening Gouda and Others v Commissariaat voor de Media | 1991 | [29.08.91, ECR I-4007] | prohibition of advertising broadcasting from abroad |
| Case T-35.91 | Eurosport Consortium v Commission of the European Communities | 1991 | [ECR II-1359, 28.11.91] | whether Sky could pull out of the Eurosport consortium |
| Case C-98.92 | La Cinq vs the European Commission | 1992 | [07-05-1992, ECR II-0001] | whether the EBU was acting in the capacity of a cartel |
| Case C-211.91. | European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium | 1992 | [24.11.92, ECR I-6757] | failure to fulfil obligations concerning access to cable television networks |
| Case T-543.93 | Gestevisión Telecinco SA v Commission of the European Communities | 1993 | [14.12.93, ECR II- 1409] | whether the EBU was acting in the capacity of a cartel |
| Case C-23.93 | Vereniging Veronica Omroep Organisatie v Commissariaat voor de Media | 1993 | [05.10.93, ECR I-4795] | abuse of dominant position |
| Case C-23.93 | TV10 SA v Commissariaat voor de Media | 1994 | [26.11.94, ECR I-4795] | prevention of foreign advertising broadcasts |
| Joined cases C-241.91 P AND C-242.91 P | Radio Telefos Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd vs Commission of the European Communities | 1995 | [06.04.95, ECR I-0743] | abuse of dominant position preventing the publishing and sale of comprehensive weekly television guides |
| Case C-222.94 | Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland | 1996 | [30.04.96, ECR I-4025] | failure to implement Directive 89.552.EEC |
| Joined cases C-320.94, C-328.94, C-329.94, C-337.94, C-338.94 and C-339.94 | Reti Televisive Italiane SpA (RTI) (C-320.94), Radio Torre (C-328.94), Rete A Srl (C-329.94), Vallau Italiana Promomarket Srl (C-337.94), Radio Italia Solo Musica Srl and Others (C-338.94) and GETE Srl (C-339.94) v Ministero delle Poste e Telecomunicazioni | 1996 | [12.12.96, ECR I-6471] | reference for a preliminary ruling by the Tribunale amministrativo regionale del Lazio of Italy on the interpretation of the TWF Directive 89.552.EEC relating to broadcasting |
| Case T-52.96 R | Sogecable SA v Commission of the European Communities | 1996 | [12.07.96, ECR 0797] | dominant position |
| Joined cases T-528.93, T-542.93, T-543.93 and T-546.93 | Metropole télévision SA and Reti Televisive Italiane SpA and Gestevisión Telecinco SA and Antena 3 de Televisión v Commission of the European Communities | 1996 | [11.07.96, ECR II-0649] | whether the EBU was acting in the capacity of a cartel |
| Case C-14.96 | Criminal proceedings against Paul Denuit. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles |
1997 | [29.05.97, ECR I-2785] | evasion of domestic legislation |
| Case T-504.93 | Tiercé Ladbroke SA v Commission of the European Communities | 1997 | [12.06.97, ECR II-0923] | dominant position in exclusive rights broadcasting |
| Case C-56.96 | VT4 Ltd v Vlaamse Gemeenschap | 1997 | [05.06.97, ECR I-3143] | evasion of domestic legislation |
| Joined cases C-34.95, C-35.95 and C-36.95 | Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v De Agostini
(Svenska) Förlag AB (C-34.95) and TV-Shop i Sverige AB (C-35.95 and C-36.95) |
1997 | [09.07.97, ECR I-3843] | Whether the TWF includes the transmission of advertising and whether a member state can prohibit advertising to children under the age of twelve |
| Case C-368.95 | Familiapress v Bauer | 1997 | [29.11.97, ECR I-3689] | Whether a prohibition on publication of sale of foreign newspapers constitutes protection of media pluralism |
Source: compiled by Alison Harcourt
V. Laws and Court Cases (most of which are available on the PCMLP netsite)
Laws
British 1996 Broadcasting Act
British 1990 Broadcasting Act
British 1976 Restrictive Trade Practices Act
British 1973 Fair Trading Act
Dutch 1998 Telecommunications Act (no. 610)
Dutch 1998 Media Decree
Dutch 1997 Competition Act (No. 242)
Dutch 1994 Amendment to the Media Act
Dutch 1990 Amendment to the Media Act
Dutch 1988 Media Act (No. 249)
French 1998 Intellectual Property Law
French 1996 Information Superhighway Law
French 1994 Broadcasting Law
French 1990 Telecommunications Law
French 1986 Press Law
French 1986 Freedom of Communication Law
French 1986 Press Law
French 1986 Competition Law
French 1984 Law on Transparency
French 1982 Law on Audiovisual Communication
French 1977 Concentration Control Law
German 1997 Communications Law
German 1996 Interstate Agreement on broadcasting (also available in English)
German 1991 Interstate Agreement on broadcasting
German 1987 Interstate Agreement on broadcasting
German 1949 Federal Constitution
Italian 1997 New Media Act No. 249
Italian 1990 Broadcasting Act No. 223
Italian 1990 Competition Law No. 287
Italian 1975 Broadcasting Law (no. 103)
Italian 1987 Publishing Law
Italian 1948 Press Law no. 47
European Court of Justice cases
Case 155/73 Tribunale civile e penale di Biella
Case 52/79 Procureur du Roi v Marc J.V.C. Debauve and others
Case 262/81 Coditel SA, Compagnie Generale pour la Diffusion de la Television and others v Cine-Vog Films SA and others
Case 126/80 Maria Salonia v Giorgio Poidomani and Franca Baglieri, née Giglio
Case 262/81 Coditel SA. and others vs. Cinè Vog. And others, (Coditel II)
Case 298/83 Comité des industries cinématographiques des Communautés européennes
(CICCE) v Commission of the European Communities
Case 311/84 Telemarketing vs. CLT
Case 163/84 Hauptzollamt Hannover v Telefunken Fernseh und Rundfunk GmbH
Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders and others v The Netherlands State
Case 77/89 R Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission of the European Communities
Case T-70/89 The British Broadcasting Corporation and BBC Enterprises Limited v Commission of the European Communities
Case T-76/89 Independent Television Publications Ltd v Commission of the European Communities
Case C-353/89. Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands
Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tilorassi - Anonimi Etairia v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas
Case C-288/89 Stichting Collectiev Antennevoorziening Gouda and Others v Commissariaat voor de Media
Case T-35/91 Eurosport Consortium v Commission of the European Communities
Case C-98/92 La Cinq vs the European Commission
Case C-211/91. European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium
Case T-543/93 Gestevisión Telecinco SA v Commission of the European Communities
Case C-23/93 Vereniging Veronica Omroep Organisatie v Commissariaat voor de Media
Case C-23/93 TV10 SA v Commissariaat voor de Media
Joined cases C-241/91 P AND C-242/91 P Radio Telefos Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd vs Commission of the European Communities
Case C-222/94 Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Joined cases C-320/94, C-328/94, C-329/94, C-337/94, C-338/94 and C-339/94 Reti Televisive Italiane SpA (RTI) (C-320/94), Radio Torre (C-328/94), Rete A Srl (C-329/94), Vallau Italiana Promomarket Srl (C-337/94), Radio Italia Solo Musica Srl and Others (C-338/94) and GETE Srl (C-339/94) v Ministero delle Poste e Telecomunicazioni
Case T-52/96 R Sogecable SA v Commission of the European Communities
Joined cases T-528/93, T-542/93, T-543/93 and T-546/93 Metropole télévision SA and Reti Televisive Italiane SpA and Gestevisión Telecinco SA and Antena 3 de Televisión v Commission of the European Communities
Case C-14/96 Criminal proceedings against Paul Denuit.
Reference for a preliminary ruling: Tribunal de première instance de
Bruxelles
Case T-504/93 Tiercé Ladbroke SA v Commission of the European Communities
Case C-56/96 VT4 Ltd v Vlaamse Gemeenschap
Joined cases C-34/95, C-35/95 and C-36/95 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v De Agostini (Svenska) Förlag AB
(C-34/95) and TV-Shop i Sverige AB (C-35/95 and C-36/95)
Case C-368/95 Familiapress v Bauer
VI. References for Further Reading
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